Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities

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a specter does not only cause séance tables to turn, but sets heads spinning.¹

Ghosts, spirits, and specters have played vital roles in oral and written narratives throughout history and across cultures, appearing as anything from figments of the imagination, divine messengers, benign or exacting ancestors, and pesky otherworldly creatures populating particular loci to disturbing figures returned from the dead bent on exacting revenge, revealing hidden crimes, continuing a love affair or simply searching for a way to pass on. Their representational and socio-cultural functions, meanings, and effects have been at least as manifold as their shapes—or non-shapes, as the case may be—and extend far beyond the rituals, traditions, ghost stories, folktales, and urban legends they populate.

It is part of this beyond that The Spectralities Reader seeks to address by focusing on how, at the end of the twentieth century, a specific metamorphosis occurred of ghosts and haunting from possible actual entities, plot devices, and clichés of common parlance (“he is a ghost of himself,” “we are haunted by the past”) into influential conceptual metaphors permeating global (popular) culture and academia alike. A conceptual metaphor, Mieke Bal suggests, differs from an ordinary one in evoking, through a dynamic comparative interaction, not just another thing, word or idea and its associations, but a discourse, a system of producing knowledge.² Besides fulfilling an aesthetic or semantic function, then, a conceptual metaphor “performs theoretical work.”³ The ghost’s emerging status as an analytical tool that does theory—and thereby, as Derrida notes in the above epigraph, “sets heads spinning”—was signaled and delineated by the sudden preference
expressed in 1990s cultural criticism for the somewhat archaic terms "specter" and "spectrality" over the more mundane "ghost" and "ghostliness." sug “Specter” and “spectrality” not only have a more serious, scholarly ring to them, but specifically evoke an etymological link to visibility and vision, to that which is both looked at (as fascinating spectacle) and looking (in the sense of examining), suggesting their suitability for exploring and illuminating phenomena other than the putative return of the dead. In their new spectral guise, certain features of ghosts and haunting—such as their liminal position between visibility and invisibility, life and death, materiality and immateriality, and their association with powerful affects like fear and obsession—quickly came to be employed across the humanities and social sciences to theorize a variety of social, ethical, and political questions. These questions include, among others, the temporal and spatial sedimentation of history and tradition, and its impact on possibilities for social change; the intricacies of memory and trauma, personal and collective; the workings and effects of scientific processes, technologies, and media; and the exclusionary, effacing dimensions of social norms pertaining to gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class.

The publication of Jacques Derrida’s *Spectres de Marx* in 1993 (and its English translation, *Specters of Marx*, in 1994) is commonly considered the catalyst for what some have called the “spectral turn,” marking the appearance of a new area of investigation of which the past two decades represent an apogee and of which this *Reader* collects a number of influential texts, chosen to display the extent of spectrality’s critical scope in contemporary cultural theory. Before charting this still-developing area in more detail and specifying the distinctive trajectories of spectrality explored in the six parts that constitute this *Reader*, it is first necessary to look back further than the 1990s in order to ask what changed at this time with regard to the critical perception of ghosts and haunting, and how this change was precipitated.

The ghost as actuality, metaphor, and concept

As noted, the figure of the ghost has haunted human culture and imagination for a long time, perhaps even forever, although more insistently in certain societies and periods than in others. One of its heydays in the western world came in the late nineteenth century, when the literary fashion for ghost stories (developed in Romanticism and the genres of the Gothic and the fantastic) intersected with the effort to unlock other worlds and dimensions—material, psychic, and supernatural—that characterized both spiritualism, in its entanglement with new religious movements, the
emergent discipline of psychology, and the professionalization of science in general, and the invention of penetrating yet intangible new media such as telegraphy, photography, and cinema. In this era, the ghost already operated as a powerful metaphor for encounters with disturbing forms of otherness (including that contained inside the self, the home, and the homeland), the obscurations inherent to capitalist commodity production (as outlined by Marx and Engels), and the ungraspable operations of newly discovered particles and microbes, as well as technological processes such as X-rays. This figurative use, however, remained grounded, to an extent, in the ghost’s possible reality as an empirically verifiable supernatural phenomenon, making it less a tool for obtaining insight into something else than itself an object of knowledge and scientific experimentation (as, for example, in spirit photography and the exploits of the Society for Psychological Research, founded in 1882). In a way, the widespread obsession with proving or disproving the reality of spiritualist feats and related phenomena such as telepathy and clairvoyance prevented the ghost’s figurative potential from fully emancipating itself.

Although the inclination to take the ghost literally largely abated over the course of the twentieth century, turning believing in actual ghosts (as the dead returned to life or able to communicate with the living) into something of a fringe eccentricity, its lingering association with such notions seems to have rendered the ghostly somewhat toxic for scholars seeking to be taken seriously. A case in point is Freud’s famous 1919 elaboration of the unheimlich or uncanny, which meticulously seeks to avoid this concept’s contamination with anything potentially supernatural. While admitting that “spirits and ghosts” would have been a suitable and logical starting point—“We might indeed have begun our investigation with this example, perhaps the most striking of all, of something uncanny”—Freud notes how he decided against this in order to avoid intermixing the uncanny with “what is purely gruesome.”6 Ostensibly, then, ghosts and spirits are deferred because of their lack of ambiguity and singular frightfulness, a rather strange position to take given the variety of shapes and affective reactions these figures could be seen to take on and elicit in the literature, other arts, and society of the time (as, for example, the welcomed, often comforting ghosts of spiritualism). From the remainder of Freud’s text, we might surmise that what he finds truly “gruesome” is the fact that too many people remain susceptible to the backward attitude of considering ghosts a possible actuality. While this lingering susceptibility is not considered surprising, it is marked as something that ought, in time, to pass:

In our great cities, placards announce lectures that undertake to tell us how to get into touch with the souls of the departed; and it cannot be denied that not a few of the most able and penetrating minds among our
men of science have come to the conclusion, especially towards the close of their own lives, that a contact of this kind is not impossible. Since almost all of us still think as savages do on this topic, it is no matter for surprise that the primitive fear of the dead is still so strong within us and always ready to come to the surface on any provocation.  

Here, the universal inability to grasp the idea of one’s own mortality is—in what could be seen as a redoubled disavowal—displaced onto an equally repressed “primitive fear of the dead” that locates the demise outside the self in the other and explains why ghosts can only ever be threatening. Paradoxically, where repression is usually presented by Freud as withholding something important that ought to be accessed and worked through, the rejection of the belief “that the dead can become visible as spirits” is considered a commendable sign of having outgrown savage animism and primary narcissism. In this case, the content of the repressed is identified as a visible falsehood, the definitive dismissal of which is only being prevented, for the moment, by biology—which “has not yet been able to decide whether death is the inevitable fate of every living being or whether it is only a regular but yet perhaps avoidable event in life”—and by religion and government, which benefit from keeping intact the expectation of an afterlife. Once rationality prevails and animistic beliefs are overcome by all, the uncanny associated with the resurfacing of animistic beliefs—clearly considered inferior to that proceeding from “repressed infantile complexes, from the castration complex, womb-phantasies, etc.” and involving “an actual repression of some content of thought and a return of this repressed content, not a cessation of belief in the reality of such a content”—will happily be surrendered.

Freud illustrates the uncanny feeling that arises “when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality” with a story about a young married couple staying in a house with a table, the carvings on which come alive at night as “ghostly crocodiles.” This particular instance of the uncanny is associated with an “infantile element” consisting of “the over-accentuation of psychical reality in comparison with material reality,” while the story itself, which Freud apparently found in Strand Magazine, is called “naïve enough,” yet capable of producing a “quite remarkable” sense of the uncanny. Here, the susceptibility to the uncanny is explicitly related to not believing in the actuality of the ghostly events, for if they were acknowledged as real, there would be no repression (no element of really knowing better than to believe in ghosts) and consequently no uncanny effect. Only someone who has at least partially superseded what are seen as primitive or childish notions, then, has access to the uncanny, making it, as Brian McCuskey notes, “a mark of superior education” serving, in particular, to distinguish superstitious servants from their sophisticated masters: “it ... goes without saying—and Freud does
not—that a superstitious person, whose mind readily accommodates occult phenomena, will not experience the frisson of the uncanny, feeling instead only fatalism or fear. In the end, for Freud’s theory to be accepted as rational and properly scientific, it has to dissociate itself thoroughly not only from literal ghosts (by grudgingly allowing a lingering belief in them, already tempered by rationality and destined to disappear), but equally from the ghost as metaphor—hence Freud’s regret that the German “an unheimlich house” cannot be translated otherwise, in English, than as “a haunted house.” Lest the serious aesthetic study of the uncanny raise the crude specter of actual ghosts and the associated animistic worldview, it cannot in any way be linked with them.

From a different vantage point, but in a similar vein, Theodor Adorno rejects the ghostly in his “Theses against Occultism,” where occultism is declared “a symptom of a regression in consciousness” leading to an illicit mixing of the conditional and the unconditional. For Freud, too, the uncanny has to be exorcised—cleansed of ghosts—precisely because, to maintain its status as a normal, even privileged experience, it cannot, at least not exclusively, be associated with the (non-repressed) primitive animistic conception of the universe. For Adorno, it is indeed such a “reborn animalism” that, in a sweep of “panic,” undoes the gains of enlightenment and establishes, in the wake of the death of God, a “second mythology.” In pre-capitalist society, he states, occultism may have had a valid function in explaining the unfathomable elements of nature by assigning them an anthropomorphic subjectivity; now, however, it has become merely another way to conceal the alienation produced by the subject’s reification in capitalist production.

The occultist draws the ultimate conclusion from the fetish-character of commodities: menacingly objectified labour assails him on all sides from demonically grimacing objects. What has been forgotten in a world congealed into products, the fact that it has been produced by men, is split off and misremembered as a being in itself added to that of the objects and equivalent to them. Because objects have frozen in the cold light of reason, lost their illusory animation, the social quality that now animates them is given an independent existence both natural and supernatural, a thing among things.

Rather than remembering, in good Marxist fashion, that the laborer is the one who produces the object and its (added) value, the occultist takes the object for an autonomous agent, enhancing its status as a fetish while seeking to deny it. Historical processes and the fact that it is people who oppress people are obfuscated, Adorno suggests, by fortune-tellers, psychic researchers, and “astrological hocus-pocus,” all working to transfer agency and responsibility to an external, ungraspable, non-material force.
Adorno's rather hyperbolic rant against occult practices that were, by the time of writing in the 1940s, already rather marginal, but which are nevertheless likened to Fascism and seen to wield a totalitarian power, leaves little room for understanding the reasons why people invest themselves in these beliefs. He goes as far as to dismiss the fear of death he, like Freud, recognizes might underlie "the woeful idiocy they practice" as itself "crass." 18

The elided material diagnosis of the collective catastrophe society is heading towards is seen to invalidate any personal longing for hope or comfort as a childish indulgence, generating more than a whiff of the same elitism pervading Freud's discussion of the uncanhy. If mediums convey "nothing more significant than the dead grandmother's greetings and the prophecy of an imminent journey," this can have no possible value for Adorno. 19 It merely marks those who take them seriously as "dunces," who, instead of challenging the way capitalism deprives their existence of worth, revel in its "everyday dreariness." 20

While the occult is condemned for mixing the conditional and unconditional, Adorno praises the traditional religions for stressing the "inseparability of the spiritual and the physical": soul and body should not be thought apart from each other, as the supposed freedom of the soul (or mind) serves merely to conceal the unfreedom of the laboring body. 21 Only by thinking the spiritual as part of the physical, subsumed under it, does it become amenable to materialist critique. As in Freud, then, it is not just the supposed existence of actual ghosts that Adorno derides, but also the figurative use of spirit, from which the dangerous belief in the autonomous material reality of the ghost and the soul alike is seen to originate: "The doctrine of the existence of the Spirit, the ultimate exaltation of bourgeois consciousness, ... bore teleologically within it the belief in spirits, its ultimate degradation." 22 The only possible conclusion, drawn in Adorno's final sentence, is that there must not be any ghost or spirit, actual or metaphorical: "No spirit exists." 23

How can the change from this reluctance to appeal to the figure of the ghost to Derrida's—and others'—wholehearted embrace of it at the end of the twentieth century be explained? What is striking in this respect is that Derrida's rehabilitation of the ghostly takes inspiration from precisely the two systems of thought represented by Freud and Adorno: psychoanalysis and Marxism. The latter, as is well known, provides the main impetus for Specters of Marx, which endeavors to conjure not only the multiple legacies of Marx's thought in the present—its haunting survival beyond the fall of the Berlin Wall and Francis Fukuyama's proclamation of the "end of history"—but also Marx's own alleged obsession with getting rid of ghosts. Following this line of thought, Adorno's dismissal of the occult as occultus, as concealing the secret that is the real condition of the material world, can be seen to restage Marx's ghostbusting stance, which, according to Derrida, is similarly aimed at making visible what is actually present:
against occult practices that were, by the
social contract, rather marginal, but which are never-
theless wielded in a totalitarian power, leaves little
surprise, given the speed and ease with which people invest themselves in these practices out of the fear of death he, like Freud, recog-
ized. Yet the claim that they practice “as itself “crass.”18
The collective catastrophist society is heading for an epistemological and metaphysical awakening as a personal longing for hope or comfort as much as for a release from the same elitism that makes one feel uncanny. If mediums convey “nothing more” than the return of “the mother’s greetings” and the prophecy of a future self, they do not have no possible value for Adorno.19 It is the basis for mixing the conditional and the unconditional, the tradition and the maternal, for stressing the idea of the “physical”: soul and body should not be the same as the supposed freedom of the soul (or freedom of the laboring body).20 Only then can the physical, subsumed under it, does not constitute the ultimate exaltation of bourgeois norms and values within it in the belief in spirits, its own. The possible conclusion, drawn in Adorno’s work, is that there is nothing but any ghost or spirit, actual or

Marx is very firm: when one has destroyed a phantomatic body, the real body remains. When the ghostly body (die gespenstige Leibhaftigkeit) of the emperor disappears, it is not the body that disappears, merely its menacing, its phantomatic (Gespensterhaftigkeit). The emperor is then more real than ever and one can measure better than ever his actual power (wirkliche Macht).24

While Derrida’s re-reading of Marx’s work—especially his assertion that deconstruction “has remained faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism, to at least one of its spirits” and enables its “radicalization”25—can (and has been) critiqued,26 his suggestion that rather than being expelled, the ghost should remain, be lived with, as a conceptual metaphor signaling the ultimate disjunctiveness of ontology, history, inheritance, materiality, and ideology, has been widely taken up. As related to “the deconstructive thinking of the trace, of iterability, of prosthetic synthesis, of supplementarity, and so forth,” the ghost ceases to be seen as obscurantist and becomes, instead, a figure of clarification with a specifically ethical and political potential.27

The second, psychoanalytical locus of inspiration for Derrida’s work is the “spectral” nature of the spectral. It is found in the two forewords he wrote in the 1970s to Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy and Abraham’s “The Shell and the Kernel,” respectively entitled “Fors” and “Me-Psychoanalysis.”28 What attracts him in the work of these Hungarian-born psychoanalysts is their utopia of a spirit from that which is present or presentable: besides the visible shell, the kernel, as that which is “inaccessible” and marked “with absolute non-presence,” also becomes a carrier of meaning.29 Moreover, the meanings contained in the kernel-like psychic formations of the crypt (an incorporated traumatic secret or loss of the self) and the phantom (an incorporated traumatic secret or loss of the other) are heterogeneous and consequently not amenable to systematic, instantaneous decoding; instead, they require multiple, laborsome, and creative processes of translation or “analytico-poetic transcription.”30

It is easy to see how these ideas chime with Derrida’s elaboration of, for instance, différence, even though, as Colin Davis explains in the article reprinted in this Reader, within Abraham and Torok’s clinical orientation the process of deferred meaning is supposed to come to an eventual standstill in the curative moment. While no explicit mention of spectrality is made by Derrida in either foreword, the stated appreciation of the radically non-presentational figure of “the heterocryptic ghost that returns from the unconscious of the other, according to what might be called the law of another generation”31 strongly foreshadows Specters of Marx’s discussion of the specter as a figure of presence-absence, the negotiation of which compels a “politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations.”32

Abraham himself, in “Notes on the Phantom: A Complement to Freud’s Metapsychology,” does not hesitate to employ ghosts metaphorically,
confident as he is of their ultimate unreality: “It is a fact that the ‘phantom,’ whatever its form, is nothing but an invention of the living.” Although the need to state this explicitly and his choice to place the term “phantom” — the synonym for ghost most intimately associated with the illusionary — between quotation marks may indicate an element of caution, the psychic formation it describes is unashamedly said to haunt. In fact, embodied ghosts are seen to derive from a more fundamental psychic figuration: “The phantoms of folklore merely objectify a metaphor active within the unconscious: the burial of an unspeakable fact within the loved one.” This resembles Adorno’s insistence that Geist (spirit) becomes ghost, only here it leads to the positive conclusion that looking at objectified ghosts and their antics can elucidate the workings of the mind: “Here we are in the midst of clinical psychoanalysis and still shrouded in obscurity, an obscurity, however, that the nocturnal being of phantoms (if only in the metapsychological sense) can, paradoxically, be called upon to clarify.” What ensues is a consideration of intergenerational trauma as a haunting force, where the notion of haunting, as site of comparison, clarifies both the temporal and spatial aspects of the affliction, while its resolution is described as the phantom being “successfully exorcised.”

Yet another early engagement on Derrida’s part with the ghost is found in Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question from 1987. In contrast to Adorno’s indictment of the metaphorical use of Spirit as generating its embodied counterparts—he calls occultism “the enfant terrible of the mystical moment in Hegel”—Derrida insists that the two cannot be fully separated (which, incidentally, does not amount to their equation). Heidegger’s vacillating between refusing spirit as anti-ontological and appealing to it as a non-religious form of spirituality that founds the world, without being able to keep the different meanings of Geist from infecting each other, is described through recourse to the vocabulary of the ghost and haunting:

Geist is always haunted by its Geist: a spirit, or in other words, in French [and English] as in German, a phantom, always surprises by returning to be the other’s ventriloquist. Metaphysics always returns, I mean in the sense of a revenant [ghost], and Geist is the most fatal figure of this revenance [returning, haunting]. Of the double who can never be separated from the single.

The spirit, in its lexical link to the ghost, exhibits a “spectral duplicity,” a self-haunting that “allows neither analysis nor dissolution into the simplicity of a perception.” Not only can the metaphorical and the literal sense of Geist not be kept apart, the metaphysical ghost and its penchant for haunting now becomes the basis for the concept of this inseparability, for the single that is always already double, the “origin-heterogeneous” [hétérogène à l’origine]. The latter will, in Specters of Marx, where the
“It is a fact that the ‘phantom,’ mention of the living,”33 Although choice to place the term “phantom” associated with the illusionary – an element of caution, the psychic laid to haunt. In fact, embodied as a fundamental psychic figuration: a metaphor active within the fact within the lived one.”34 This spirit becomes ghost, only here it remains at objectified ghosts and their mind: “Here we are in the midst guided in obscurity, an obscurity, phantoms (if only in the metaphysico-logical and appealing to it as a specter, the specter as possibility.”44 To believe or not believe in ghosts no longer involves a determination about the empirical (im)possibility of the supernatural, but indicates contrasting validated attitudes—a welcoming seen as ethical and enabling, and a rejection considered unethical and dispossessing—towards the uncertainty, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and indeterminacy that characterize language and Being because of their inevitable entanglement with alterity and difference. Derrida, then, far from being a ghostbuster like Freud, Adorno, and Abrahm and Tórek, uses the figure of the ghost to pursue (without ever fully apprehending) that which haunts like a ghost and, by way of this haunting, demands justice, or at least a response.

This quest cannot be called a science, or even a method, as the ghost or specter is seen to signify precisely that which escapes full cognition or comprehensibility: “One does not know: not out of ignorance, but because this non-object, this non-present present, this being-there of an absent or departed one no longer belongs to knowledge.”45 Hence our pluralization of “spectralities” in the title of this Reader and our hesitancy in presenting the spectral investigations gathered here as a new field or discipline (both of which imply delineation and control). The ghost, even when turned into a conceptual metaphor, remains a figure of unrolliness pointing to the tangibly ambiguous. While it has insight to offer, especially into those matters that are commonly considered not to matter and into the ambiguous itself, its own status as discourse or epistemology is never stable, as the ghost also questions the formation of knowledge itself and specifically invokes what is placed outside it, excluded from perception and, consequently, from both the archive as the depository of the sanctioned, acknowledged past and politics as the (re)imagined present and future.
Although Specters of Marx is often seen to stand at the origin of the so-called “spectral turn” (a turn of phrase whose aptness and risks are at stake in the first part of this Reader), it would go against the spirit of the specter—and Derrida’s elaboration of it—to assign a unitary genesis to what was in fact a diffuse, extended cultural moment. We have already seen that Derrida’s ideas can be traced back to at least the 1970s and are predicated on the work of others.46 In addition, his elaboration of spectrality coincided with further conceptual investigations of ghosts and haunting that opened up different avenues of inquiry. One example is Terry Castle’s The Apparitional Lesbian (1993), which, by exploring the pervasive cultural disavowal of lesbianism through acts of “ghosting” (rendering lesbian sexuality invisible by associating it with the ephemeral) and thus emphasizing the ghost’s association with dispossession, disappearance, and social erasure, provides an important counterweight to Derrida’s emphasis on the specter as a powerful haunting force.47 Another early conceptual exploration of the ghostly is found in Anthony Vidler’s The Architectural Uncanny (1992), from which a section is included here.

By way of an architectural consideration of notions of house and home, Vidler brings the uncanny (presented as a metaphor or trope that exceeds its Freudian elaboration) together with the ghost to suggest that “the uncanny might regain a political connotation as the very condition of contemporary haunting.”48 The specific architectural projects analyzed, which explore the possibility of making absence present through materializations of invisibility, translucency, and transparency, concretize what Derrida would call the “non-sensuous sensuous.”49 Moreover, Vidler’s attention for the spatial dimension of haunting—its association with displacement and the out-of-place—marks a different path from Specters of Marx’s focus on the ghost’s temporality, its tendency to put time out of joint.

The renewed conceptual interest in ghosts and haunting that characterized the 1990s has also been linked to a broader (and somewhat earlier) turn to history and memory, concentrating in particular on dealing with personal and collective trauma. Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, for instance, connects “spectral discourse” with “the recent preoccupation with ‘trauma’ in which the presence of a symptom demonstrates the subject’s failure to internalize a past event, in which something from the past emerges to disrupt the present.”50 The next section explores how certain elaborations of spectrality do indeed dovetail with the concerns of trauma studies, while at the same time insisting that, as a cross-disciplinary concept used to tackle a wide variety of phenomena, it goes beyond them.
Spectrality and trauma studies

Already in his Cultural Semantics from 1998, Martin Jay was speaking out about the “uncanny nineties,” a particular Zeitgeist that described the “current obsession with the troubled interface between history and memory” and the concern with “the way the past makes cultural demands on us we have difficulty fulfilling.” In this academic milieu of saturated ghostliness, Jay perceived a problem in the collapsing of “the metaphoric and the real, the symbolic and the literal,” claiming that it was “now the height of canniness to market the uncanny.” The disdain for any lingering belief in actual returnees from the dead or other supernatural entities that led Freud and Adorno to shy away from even metaphorical uses had apparently reversed into an uncritical and undifferentiated acceptance of any and all figurative ghosts. This pervasive haunting of the academy, according to Jay, had echoes in the “recent debates over alleged repressed memory” that were occupying scholars in the field of psychology. As Abraham and Torok’s notion of the phantom (as unconsciously inherited loss or secret) already indicated, the conceptual metaphor of spectrality is deeply embedded within the discourse of loss, mourning, and recovery that delineated the multidisciplinary project of trauma studies as it emerged in the 1980s. To be traumatized, as Cathy Caruth has explained, is to be “possessed by an image or event” located in the past. To be “possessed”—gripped indefinitely by an anachronistic event—also describes the condition of being haunted, as it has been commonly construed. In other words, when we think of ghost stories (traditional ones, at least), it is the haunting of the present by the past that emerges as the most insistent narrative. The mode of expression that many scholars use to describe the spectral, then, is similar to, if not fully consonant with, the terms used to describe the affective qualities of trauma. Take, for instance, Ulrich Baer’s chapter from Spectral Evidence reprinted here, in which he discusses Mikael Levin’s and Dirk Reinartz’s strikingly analogous photographs of contemporary landscapes growing in the areas where Nazi concentration camps used to stand. These are places that “[have] not been fully mastered and contained,” characterized by their “enigmatic structure,” and which confront us with the limits of historicization. Baer addresses these photographs as traumatic and ghostly, given that, as spectators, we have arrived late at the scene of a “retained past” that nevertheless reminds us of its absence in our present.

As Roger Luckhurst has outlined in The Trauma Question, the history of this disorder can be traced back to its physical origins in the 1600s, to the rise of psychology in the Victorian period, and, later, its reemergence at the end of the 1970s with the coinage of the term “post-traumatic stress disorder” (PTSD)—a diagnosis used for Vietnam veterans suffering from hallucinations, shell shock, and other forms of post-combat stress.
Critics within trauma studies have expanded on this paradigm to address catastrophic personal and collective experiences, and the acts of witnessing and testimony related to them. Ranging from colonial violence and the genocides that transpired, for example, during the Holocaust and in Rwanda during the early 1990s, to the events of 9/11, these experiences are seen as eliding and literally rupturing comprehension; they are past acts which we would like to access again in order to attempt changing them, and which the traumatized often relive compulsively, but that remain locked in their inaccessibility and relentless repetition.

Scholars like Caruth have come to understand post-traumatic duress as not simply a "symptom of the unconscious," but "a symptom of history" as well. Here we can see how the condition of the traumatized individual is catapulted into the larger, multi-subjective experience of a global culture in which the avant-garde dream of the revolutionary new is being replaced with, following Dominick LaCapra, the "memory-work" of studies of the past conducted in earnest during the final decades of the last century and the beginning of the twenty-first. Thus, Caruth describes traumatized individuals as historical subjects, in the sense that, much like Abraham and Torok's phantom-laden patients, they "carry an impossible history within them or they become themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely possess." Trauma, as Caruth describes it, is forever engaged in the quest for an answer, an evanescent truth. Such is the case with ghosts that arrive from the past, seeking to establish an ethical dialogue with the present. Ghosts, in this case, are part of a symptomatology of trauma, as they become both the objects of and metaphors for a wounded historical experience.

Within the growing fields of memory and trauma studies, different and divergent arguments have emerged, especially with respect to the palliative possibilities of memory-work (which tends to envision a conjuration of the past's truth, primarily through giving a voice to its victims, which is subsequently laid to rest as traumatic repetition is foreclosed and the memory integrated into a narrative account). As Richard Crownshaw has recently pointed out, the reliance of certain branches of trauma studies on "individual psychological and psychoanalytic definitions of experience" may drive the field into an "overpersonalisation" and, subsequently, "dehistoricisation" of collective experience. One of trauma studies' most outspoken critics has been Andreas Huyssen. In "Present Pasts: Media, Politics, Amnesia," he speaks of a "globalization paradox" of traumatic events like the Holocaust, whereby this event has become an absolute "cipher for the twentieth century as a whole." What Huyssen describes here is a singular model of trauma (and its potential resolution) that is subsequently applied to other situations that, while perhaps similar in some ways, are nevertheless historically, culturally, and politically removed from the experiences of the Jews under Nazism. This "totalization" risks
erasing the Holocaust's specificity, as well as locking other experiences of catastrophe and loss within a distant, now universalized and universalizing, model. Instead, Huyssen argues for a conception of remembrance in which memory and trauma are not treated as synonymous:

It has been all too tempting to some to think of trauma as the hidden core of all memory. After all, both memory and trauma are predicated on the absence of that which is negotiated in memory or in the traumatic symptom. Both are marked by instability, transitoriness, and structures of repetition. But to collapse memory into trauma ... would unduly confine our understanding of memory, marking it too exclusively in terms of pain, suffering, and loss.44

The danger in marking all remembering with the affective registers of melancholia is that we may come to understand memory as working solely on the basis of repetition and negativity, rather than on its progressive (future) productivity. Here, we may remember Freud's equally singular association of the ghost with the gruesome and begin to be reminded of the innovation inherent in Derrida's conceptualization of the specter—which is always both revenant (invoking what was) and arrivant (announcing what will come)—as operating on a number of temporal planes, most crucially the future and its possible interactions with the present and the past. Derrida's specter not only "signals the unbidden imposition of parts of the past on the present, and the way in which the future is always already populated with certain possibilities derived from the past," but also, through its association with the messianic, or, less enigmatically, with Gayatri Spivak's ghost dance as future anterior, the potential for different re-articulations of these possibilities.61 Unlike traumatic repetition, after all, the ghost is a figure of surprise that does not necessarily reappear in exactly the same manner or guise. Moreover, it provokes the one it haunts to a response or reaction, leading Avery F. Gordon to note that "haunting, unlike trauma, is distinctive for producing a something-to-be-done."66

Analyzing the problems of contemporary historiography, LaCapra seeks a way out of trauma discourse's melancholic conundrum by separating loss from absence. In its persistent reference to the missing object, loss can transform into nostalgia or, worse, a "utopian politics in quest of a new totality or fully unified community" when it is conflated with a conception of absence.67 Put simply, absence that is interiorized as loss entails a process of incessant mourning and melancholia, as well as an overlaying of the planes of the then with those of the now. Absence describes something related, but quite different, to loss: we can understand it as transhistorical (structural) trauma, according to LaCapra, while loss must retain its historical specificity. As he explains:
Something of the past always remains, if only as a haunting presence or revenant. Moreover, losses are specific and involve particular events, such as the death of loved ones on a personal level or, on a broader scale, the losses brought about by apartheid or by the Holocaust in its effects on Jews and other victims of the Nazi genocide, including both the lives and cultures of affected groups. I think it is misleading to situate loss on a transhistorical level, something that happens when it is conflated with absence and conceived as constitutive of existence.  

In an argument that resonates with Huyssen’s critique of the trauma paradigm, LaCapra argues for an understanding of trauma as grounded in the specific event, and the experiences that surround it.

LaCapra’s prescription to work through the dialectics of absence and loss, and thus to produce “a condition of possibility of historicity,” in many ways echoes Derrida’s injunction to learn to “live otherwise, and better” by learning “to live with ghosts,” and the latter’s insistence that a history conceived as spectral would necessitate a reflection of how the past is both absent and present within the now moment, but also how the past can open up the possibilities for the future. However, at the same time, Derrida could be said to be guilty of a similar dehistoricizing conflation to that between loss and absence. Hauntology, as a disjointed, non-foundational alternative ontology, rivals LaCapra’s notion of absence in its tendency towards universality and transhistoricism, as becomes clear when Derrida states that “it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time.” Undoubtedly, such a generalized notion of haunting has its uses, as does the idea of structural trauma. A distinction, however, must be maintained between the ghost as “only one in a series of deconstructive tropes,” a meta-concept that comes to possess virtually everything, and its more specific conceptualizations, where ghosts and haunting are taken up as historically and culturally particular, and where they may even be re-supernaturalized.

For Derrida, hauntology reshapes history by disrupting its conventional structure of chronology: “haunting is historical, to be sure, but it is not dated, it is never docilely given a date in the chain of presents, day after day, according to the instituted order of a calendar.” This may serve to counter the historical overdetermination (the search for truth in a fixed point of origin) that characterizes certain incarnations of trauma studies, but it also causes the specters he conjures to remain strangely unmoored from historical contexts, as all ghosts, by being reduced to their most general characteristics, become essentially the same (as do all exorcists). Ghosts, then, are not only apt embodiments and figurations of trauma, but trauma theory also provides valuable lessons as it responds to and takes on board critiques equally applicable to certain elaborations of spectrality. As
the texts collected in this Reader show, a large part of the effort in the wake of Specters of Marx has been to specify the ghost's conceptual potential in relation to history and memory by pointing out, for example, that historical events or memories, even when ostensibly similar in kind, may give rise to vastly different hauntings, and that even the same event may not return in identical ways across time. All history and memory may indeed be spectral in some sense, but understanding the effects of particular instances requires careful contextualization and conceptual delimitation.

Having sketched the contact zone between trauma studies and theories of spectrality, it is important to avoid the impression that the ghost as conceptual metaphor is limited to elucidating issues of memory and history (whether traumatic or not); while these are important—perhaps even dominant—areas of investigation, spectrality has proven useful in addressing many other issues, to the point of seeming ubiquitous. While the extent of its scholarly reach will be outlined at the end of this introduction, the penultimate section explores the familiar danger of a newly popular academic concept turning into a bandwagon.

**Stretching the ghost**

The multidisciplinary applicability of trauma scholarship, and spectrality studies more broadly, means that terms developed within one field of study are employed in others. This transferability, while opening up interdisciplinary opportunities, may also result in rather cyclical, if not overstretched, interpretations of the uses, meanings, and possibilities of haunting. Recently, Roger Luckhurst has noted that “the ghost as figure of trauma has become almost a cliché, reinforced as it was throughout the 1990s by an elaborate critical discourse of spectres and ‘spectrality’.”49 Already in his critique of “the spectral turn” from 2002 (excerpted in this volume), he describes a body of London-based works of fiction, non-fiction, and criticism that he terms “the London Gothic” (marking another important intersection for spectral studies) in the following terms:

Unable to discriminate between instances and largely uninterested in historicity (beyond its ghostly disruption), the discourse of spectralized modernity risks investing in the compulsive repetitions of a structure of melancholic entrapment. In this mode, to suggest an inevitably historicized mourning-work that might actually seek to lay a ghost to rest would be the height of bad manners. And because the spectral infiltrates the hermeneutic act itself, critical work can only replicate tropes from textual sources, punning spiritedly around the central terms of the Gothic to produce a curious form of meta-Gothic that elides object and instrument.55
If narrative language and the language of trauma are intimate bedfellows, given that both can play and experiment on the idea of overcoming the aporias left behind by the past, then it should be no wonder that the tropes of literary texts should find a home in the body of criticism that accompanies it. What Luckhurst describes in the passage above, however, does go to the heart of the evolution of the field of spectrality studies. This area of scholarly focus is often considered as a response, and antidote, to our alleged age of amnesia, and its emphasis on the duty to remember and acknowledge the past (to keep ghosts alive) can indeed seem overly judgmental of processes of closure and forgetting. Yet at the same time, living with ghosts does not have to entail “melancholic entrapment,” since the spectral return, as noted earlier, is capable of exceeding pure replication. Conversant with nostalgia studies, yet another current within contemporary cultural theory, studies of ghosts and haunting can do more than obsessively recall a fixed past; in an active, dynamic engagement, they may reveal the insufficiency of the present moment, as well as the disconsolations and erasures of the past, and a tentative hopefulness for future resolutions.

Still, despite the presence of a discourse that, generalizing the haunted experience, may resonate with and speak to other disciplines, histories, and languages, the problem of the ghost’s specificity and its localized futurities continues to gnaw at the very idea of the absent present. As we read through the ever-growing pile of works on haunting and observe the continuing manifestation of ghosts in popular culture and the aesthetics and politics of the everyday, we must ask whether the trope of haunting and spectrality has reached its apotheosis, or (more optimistically) whether there are new ways in which we can continue to grow the field without rehearsing the registers we have been relying on for the past decades. The very appearance of this Reader signals our belief that scholarly work on spectrality has achieved a critical mass, making anthologization not only possible, but useful. This volume, however, was not undertaken in the mode of the traditional archive; we do not aim to definitively define or delimit a field, but rather to display the diverse fertility of the ghost and haunting as conceptual metaphors over a particular period, in the hope of revealing some influential trajectories and prompting future innovations (through inclusion and omission; after all, as Derrida argues in Archive Fever, archives are inevitably haunted by what they exclude). Some effort of discrimination is inevitable, though, as we have reached an important (and perhaps slightly unbeimlich) moment of self-inspection about our fascination with our condition as recovering amnesics and investigators of the spectral. Besides asking after the opportunities the spectral offers, this moment equally prompts us to gauge its limitations.

The 2010 Haunted: Contemporary Photography / Video / Performance exhibition at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum in New York struck us as coming up against the point where a concept threatens to break as it is stretched too thin. Curators Jennifer Blessing and Nat Trotman
of trauma are intimate bedfellows, and on the idea of overcoming the trauma is a trope that accompanies the body of criticism that accompanies the tropes of spectrality studies. This area of scholarly work, and antidote, to our alleged age of immediacy and its vicissitudes, is an overly judgmental of processes of mourning in time, living with ghosts does not mean ghosts are absent since the spectral return, as noted by Anderson. Conversant with nostalgia and melancholy, contemporary cultural theory, studies of hauntedness may reveal the insufficiency of the structures and erasures of the past, and their consequences. The essay that generalizing the haunted past to other disciplines, histories, and specificities and its localized futurities is absent present. As we read through the literature and observe the continuing evidence of the haunted and the aesthetics and politics of the spectrality has been (conditionally) whether there are new ways of looking at the past without rehearsing the registers of the archive. The very appearance of this body of the traditional archive; it is not about to limit a field, but rather to display conceptual metaphors over figures of documentation, preservation, and remembrance pervade the exhibition, which, despite bringing together an impressive collection of works from the 1960s to the 2000s, refused to congeal around its titular concept. Works that seem to invoke haunting only through their medium, channeled Roland Barthes’s idea that the medium of photography (which they extend to video and performance), especially in our post-capitalist age, is essentially a haunted one. However, where Barthes carefully elaborates the metaphor and, crucially, distinguishes the moving image as non-spectral, the blurb on the cover of the exhibition catalogue appears to turn any invocation of the past or tradition, and any form of reproduction, into a haunting: “Much contemporary photography and video seems haunted—by the history of art, and by the ghostly apparitions that are reanimated in reproductive mediums, live performance, and the virtual world.” At the same time, it confines the meaning of haunting to melancholic nostalgia: “By using dated, passe, or quasi-extinct stylistic devices, subject matter, and technologies, such melancholic art embodies a longing for an otherwise unrecoverable past.” The tension between an overly general interpretation—not everything that returns or is repeated is necessarily ghostly or uncanny—and a restricted reading of ghosts as figures of documentation, preservation, and remembrance pervades the exhibition, which, despite bringing together an impressive collection of works from the 1960s to the 2000s, refused to congeal around its titular concept. Works that seem to invoke haunting only through their medium,

their representation of something from the past, or their use of repetition or dated technologies were mixed with works that evoke more concrete, complex senses of ghostliness, such as the Cuban-born American visual artist Felix Gonzalez-Torres's 1989 "Untitled," a chromogenic jigsaw puzzle enveloped in plastic (Figure 1).

This image speaks to the ghost first of all thematically, in what it depicts: the rather shapeless backlit shadow figure, further deformed by the creases in the curtain, appears as an unidentifiable ghostly visitor able, as per Derrida's visor effect (the power to see without being seen), to peek through the curtain at us, while we are left to wonder at its motivations. Our propensity to interpret the image as disturbing invokes the relationship between ghosts and the gruesome (on which, as we saw, Freud insists), as well as their tendency to induce paranoia and self-doubt: are we seeing something that is not actually there? While the visitor could indeed be supernatural, the everydayness of the curtain and the fragment of the chair visible in the lower left-hand corner suggests that the socio-political relations of the material world may also produce a sense of haunting. Issues of vulnerability, invasiveness, and hospitality are hinted at, yet any unequivocal signification is foreclosed by the fact that we cannot establish whether the curtain constitutes a protective or exclusionary barrier, and whether the ghostly figure is inside or outside, a threat or the one at risk of exposure. As such, the image foregrounds the in-between or undecidable as something that may unsettle us but nevertheless cannot be banished from our lives. This idea is reinforced at the formal level, as the plastic bag interferes with our ability to see the image clearly, while its composition from puzzle pieces confronts us simultaneously with our desire for completeness and identification, and with the fact that these will never be fully achieved—the outlined edges of the pieces forever render the image interrupted, fragmented.

Gonzalez-Torres's artwork, then, counters the dilution and non-differentiation of the notion of haunting that the Haunted exhibition at large facilitated, and may also be taken to visualize our conception of this Reader, which, like the plastic bag, provides a tentative—by no means impenetrable—casing for a collection of texts that interconnect and are ordered, but could well be shuffled and rearranged. The puzzle pieces, in turn, convey our desire to stress the multiplicity and heterogeneity of recent conceptualizations of spectrality, which originate in different disciplines and approach ghosts and haunting from numerous angles in order to elucidate a variety of cultural objects, histories, and socio-political issues. This multiplicity, as the outline below explicates, includes considerations of ghosts and haunting at a general level (as something that, per Derrida's haunatology, is inherent to Being) and more specific ones, but insists, in both cases, on careful conceptual specification. Ghostliness, haunting, and spectrality are not just fashionable terms to be thrown about at random,
the past, or their use of repetition networks that evoke more concrete, the Cuban-born American visual "Intitled," a chromogenic jigsaw piece, but difficult-to-grasp phenomena that require precise delineation as they enter different contexts and scholarly frameworks.

Outline

In order to remain readable, a Reader requires some sort of grouping of its collected texts, and this volume is no exception. The groupings chosen—after a process of selection that inevitably entailed some regrettable losses—are not intended to impose a singular structure on the materials, but should be taken as flexible signposts offering one way of broaching an area of thought characterized by multiple intersections and convergences, and not yet fully crystallized (if any scholarly area, disciplinary or interdisciplinary, ever is). Each part—as well as the texts contained in them—will be introduced separately, so here we confine ourselves to indicating the general motivation for and import of the six chosen foci.

The first part, entitled "The Spectral Turn," presents a logical starting point in reflecting on the spread of spectrality as cross-disciplinary instrument of analysis in the humanities and social sciences between the early 1990s and the present, which constitutes the raison d'être for this volume. It gathers together texts by Jacques Derrida, Colin Davis, Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, Julian Wolfreys, and Roger Luckhurst that were either instrumental in inaugurating the interest in the ghost or specter as conceptual metaphor and developing this interest across different academic fields, or engage with the risks of its newfound prominence and status as an academic trend.

“Spectropolitics: Ghosts of the Global Contemporary” focuses on those recent explorations of spectrality that emphasize how, if ghosts and haunting are to be employed as conceptual metaphors, two aspects need to be taken into account. First, there is the fact that these phenomena are culturally specific, with non-western traditions yielding considerably different epistemological frameworks and critical possibilities than the western conceptions that initially dominated the spectral turn. Second, it is vital to acknowledge that notions of spectrality may facilitate the understanding and addressing of not only historical injustices and their commemoration in personal and/or collective memory, but also of situations of injustice and disempowerment arising in and from a present characterized by diffuse processes of globalization. The texts by Avery F. Gordon, Achille Mbembe, Arjun Appadurai, and Peter Hitchcock that make up this part propose, each in its own way, a “spectropolitics”—which may be a politics of or for specters—designed to address how, in different parts of the world, particular subjects become prone to social erasure, marginalization, and precarity. By analyzing how such processes can be thought in terms of spectralization or “ghosting,”
and by imagining counter-conjurations that refuse straightforward notions of rematerialization or exorcism, these critics appeal to spectrality as an alternative to or reconceptualization of the frameworks of postmodernism, postcoloniality, materialism, nationalism, and globalization.

Another dominant concern in recent considerations of spectrality has been the way in which the workings and socio-cultural impact of various media (from the telegraph and the X-ray to cinema, television, radio, and the internet) and their associated senses (most importantly vision and hearing) can be illuminated by exploring how their invention, establishment, and global consolidation was—and to some extent remains—intimately linked with the circulation of practices and discourses of the supernatural. The historical depth and cultural breadth of this particularly fruitful area of spectral investigation is represented, in the third part, “The Ghost in the Machine: Spectral Media,” by Tom Gunning, Jeffrey Sconce, Akira Mizuta Lippit, Allen S. Weiss, and David Toop.

Taking up the direction indicated by Terry Castle’s The Apparitional Lesbian, a number of critics have been engaged in exploring the specific ramifications of spectrality for questions of gender, sexuality, and race. Not only can these categories of social differentiation be seen as themselves spectral, in the sense that they are based on retrospectively naturalized, performatively ingrained distinctions that require continuous rematerialization, but they also stratify spectrality, as those excluded from the norm are likely to have greater difficulty in effectively asserting themselves as haunting forces than, for example, the sovereign subject that is Hamlet’s father. The attempt to refashion spectrality as a more differentiated concept—and as such more relevant to the specific past, present, and future struggles for recognition, respect, and justice of those identified as non-masculine, non-heterosexual, and/or non-white—is central to the fourth part of this Reader on “Spectral Subjectivities: Gender, Sexuality, and Race,” which gathers work by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Carla Freccero, Sharon Holland, and Renée L. Bergland.

The spatial dimension of the ghost—which, although central to Gothic studies, threatened to become overshadowed by the focus on temporality within Derrida’s work as well as within memory and trauma studies—is addressed in the fifth part, entitled “Possessions: Spectral Spaces,” where Anthony Vidler, Ulrich Baer, David Matless, and Giorgio Agamben demonstrate how haunting, as a conceptual metaphor, can elucidate the way architecture, landscape, geography, and tourism mediate particular presences and absences, both material and in the less apprehensible form of dealing with traumatic or oppressive pasts.

The fifth part—in particular the texts by Baer and Agamben—already makes clear that any attempt to rigorously separate the spatial from the temporal dimension of spectrality is futile; ghosts and haunting invariably involve a complication of both realms, as well as of their interaction.
that refuse straightforward notions of postmodernism, and globalization.

Considerations of spectrality have led various authors to cinema, television, radio, and the most importantly vision and hearing) and their invention, establishment, and extent remains—intimately linked discourses of the supernatural. The of this particularly fruitful area of inquiry, Jeffrey Sconce, Akira Mizuta Lyotard, and Terry Castle’s The Apparitional are engaged in exploring the specific dimensions of gender, sexuality, and race. Differentiation be seen as themselves defined on retrospectively naturalized, and or require continuous rematerialization or as those excluded from the norm effectively asserting themselves as a sovereign subject that is Hamlet’s spectrality as a more differentiated and specific past, present, and future, and justice of those identified as or non-white—is central to the concept of Subjectivities: Gender, Sexuality, and नायकीचे चक्रवर्ती.measure, Carla Bergland.

which, although central to Gothic novels, is revealed by the focus on temporality in memory and trauma studies—called “Possessions: Spectral Spaces,” by David Matless, and Giorgio Agamben. The spectral metaphor, can elucidate the present, and tourism mediate particular and in the less apprehensible form of texts.

as by Baer and Agamben—already crucially separate the spatial from the spectral; ghosts and haunting invariably texts, as well as of their interaction.

Therefore, the sixth and final part, “Haunted Historiographies,” should be seen not as a counterpoint to the fifth, but as its continuation, just as it has strong links with the differentiated histories—and their haunting legacies—of particular subjects as delineated in the fourth one. Where the final part places its own emphasis, however, is in its focus not so much on specific histories as on the notion of historiography—the making of history and the way this process becomes entangled, as explicated by Judith Richardson, Jesse Alemán, and Alexander Nemirov, with notions of possession, the gothic and uncanny, and of the fine line that separates presence from absence, evidence from the barely perceptible.

Together, the six parts show the fecundity of the post-1990 use of the ghost as no longer primarily a literal phenomenon requiring empirical verification (although some do remain interested in this possibility, as is clear from the fact that the Society for Psychical Research survives until today), but a conceptual metaphor capable of bringing to light and opening up to analysis hidden, disavowed, and neglected aspects of the social and cultural realm, past and present. As such, spectrality seeks less to take the place of other approaches or concepts than to supplement them with another dimension (a twilight zone, if you will) by offering a new, truly other perspective.

Notes

3 Catherine Lord, “Set Adrift in Style: The Scholar as Fiction and Film-Maker in Jacob’s Room,” in (Inter)discipline: New Languages for Criticism, ed. Gillian Beer, Malcolm Bowie, and Beate Perrey (London: LEGENDA, 2007), 92. Teri Reynolds, whose work on cognitive metaphors Bal references, employs concepts from one field (physics) to elucidate another (narrative), stipulating that these theories are not templates that constrain texts to correspond to the physics. Far from merely illustrating what is already known, they shape and articulate new critical possibilities.” The “new critical possibilities” uncovered by spectrality as a cognitive or conceptual metaphor are what The Spectralities Reader seeks to present. Teri Reynolds, “Spacetime and Imagetext,” The Germanic Review 73, no. 2 (2001): 161.
4 The Oxford English Dictionary confines the use of “spectre” and “spectral” for matters related to ghostly apparitions to the (late) nineteenth century, with scientific uses based on its link to “spectrum”—in biology, chemistry, mathematics, and physics—extending to the present. A cursory search on Google Scholar confirms that spectrality’s recent popularity in
the humanities and social sciences has barely dented the dominance of its
deployment in the natural sciences.

For in-depth discussions of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century culture of ghosts and its legacies, see Janet Oppenheim, *The
Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 1850–1914*
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Roger Luckhurst, *The
Invention of Telepathy: 1870–1901* (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002); Pam Thurschwell, *Literature, Technology and Magical Thinking,
1880–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Marina Warner,
*Phantasmagoria: Spirit Visions, Metaphors, and Media into the Twenty-First

Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in *Writings on Art and Literature* (Stanford:

Ibid., 219.

Ibid., 218. Significantly, Freud devotes a large part of *Beyond the Pleasure
Principle* (London: W. W. Norton, 1989) to establishing, by reference to
biological experiments with single-cell organisms, precisely that death is “the
inevitable fate of every living being.” The dread this knowledge might evoke
is assuaged by the proposition of the death drive, which makes death, as long
as it occurs naturally, a (secretly) desirable end that, moreover, does not lead
to another world but to a return to pre-birth inertia. In this manner, literal
ghosts (those returned from the dead) are rendered not only impossible, but
placed beyond human desire and impulse.

Freud, “Uncanny,” 225, italics in the original. Our reading of Freud differs
from that of Renée L. Bergland, who argues that “the long bizarre catalogue
of the weird that he presents to his readers in ‘The Uncanny’ betrays a
willingness more to entertain ghosts and horrors than to exorcize them.”
This ignores the divergent valuations Freud gives to the repressed and
the surmounted. See Bergland, *The National Uncanny: Indian Ghosts and
American Subjects* (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2000),
12.

Freud, “Uncanny,” 221.

Brian McCuskey, “Not at Home: Servants, Scholars, and the Uncanny,”


Theodor Adorno, “Theses against Occultism,” in *Minima Moralia:
Reflections from Damaged Life*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (1951; London and
New York: Verso, 2005), 238.


Adorno, “Theses,” 239.

Ibid.

Ibid., 241.

Ibid. 

Ibid.
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20 Ibid., 242.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 244. Adorno also notes how, in occultist thought, “only in the metaphor of the body can the concept of pure spirit be grasped at all, and is at the same time cancelled” (242). The spirit (here referring to the soul) should not be figuratively turned into a body, but has to stay located within the actual body as a bodily aspect, since any metaphorization indicates a departure from the material. Unlike Freud, then, Adorno might be considered hostile to metaphor in general as itself a spectralizing practice akin to the capitalist system that makes everything solid melt into air.

23 Ibid. Avery Gordon argues that in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno work towards establishing a Theory of Ghosts that would enable a “more complex understanding of the generative structures and moving parts of historically embedded social formations in a way that avoids the twin pitfalls of subjectivism and positivism.” Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (1997; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 19. However, although Horkheimer and Adorno do indeed agitate against the “disturbed relationship to the dead” that leaves them “forgotten and embalmed”—paralleled by a rejection of personal history “as something irrational, superfluous, utterly obsolete”—their argument in favor of remembering the dead and (personal) history is graphically separated, in a section entitled “Postscript,” from the main section, “The Theory of Ghosts.” Dialectics of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 178–9. There, a “unity” with the dead is proposed as “the proper relationship” to them, but this unity is explicitly not one that admits of any literal ghosts, which are seen to sublimate our dread of “death as absolute nothingness” (178). Rather, it entails a recognition—beyond the ghostly—of the “horror of annihilation” that marks both the living and the dead as “victims of the same conditions and of the same disappointed hope” (178). Thus, the metaphorical use of the ghost—which returns in the “Postscript” only once (and with a noticeable shift in terminology) to figure emigrants as “spectral intruders”—remains predicated on the need to reject its literal invocation (179).

24 Derrida, Specters, 131.

25 Ibid., 75, 92.


27 Derrida, Specters, 75.


31 Ibid., xxxi, italics in the original.

32 Derrida, Specters, xix, italics in the original.


34 Ibid., 288, italics in the original.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid., 292.

37 Adorno, “Theses,” 244.


39 Ibid., 62.

40 Ibid., 107, italics in the original.

41 Derrida, Specters, xx, italics in the original.


43 Ibid., 44–5.

44 Derrida, Specters, 12.

45 Ibid., 6. In “Spectrographies,” collected here, Derrida notes that his statement in Ken McMullen’s film Ghost Dance that “psychoanalysis plus film equals ... a science of ghosts” cannot hold because “there is something which, as soon as one is dealing with ghosts, exceeds, if not scientificity in general, at least what, for a very long time, has modeled scientificity on the real, the objective,
which is not or should not be, precisely, phantomatic.” Jacques Derrida and

Besides Abraham and Torok and Heidegger, another important influence
is the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka, whose Heretical Essays on the
Philosophy of History is analyzed in Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death,
trans. David Wills (1992; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1995). This analysis prompts an early formulation of what, in Specters
of Marx, would become the visor effect, marking the ghostly ability to see
without being seen: “The genesis of responsibility that Patočka proposes will
not simply describe a history of religion or religiousness. It will be combined
with a genealogy of the subject who says ‘myself,’ the subject’s relation to
itself as an instance of liberty, singularity, and responsibility, the relation to
self as being before the other: the other in its relation to infinite alterity, one
who regards without being seen but also whose infinite goodness gives in
an experience that amounts to a gift of death [donner la mort]” (3).

Terry Castle, The Apparitional Lesbian: Female Homosexuality and Modern

Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely

Derrida, Specters, 7.

Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock, ed., Spectral America: Phantoms and the National

Martin Jay, Cultural Semantics: Keywords of our Time (London: The Athlone

Ibid., 163.

Ibid., 164.

Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns

Ulrich Baer, Spectral Evidence: The Photography of Trauma (Cambridge, MA

Ibid., 76.


Caruth, Trauma, 5.

Dominick LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss,” Critical Inquiry 25, no. 4
(1999): 713.

Caruth, Trauma, 5.

See, for example, Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative,
and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

Richard Crowshaw, Jane Kilby, and Antony Rowland, eds., The Future of
Memory (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2010), 10. Interestingly,
Abraham and Torok’s theory of the phantom has been seen as a way to
historicize Freudian psychoanalysis. In addition to tracing the incorporated secret to specific social norms (such as the disapproval of extra-marital births) rather than invariable psychic structures, Abraham suggests that "shared or complementary phantoms" that escape exorcism can be "established as social practices." Abraham, "Notes," 292.


67 LaCapra, "Trauma," 698.

68 Ibid., 700-1.

69 Ibid., 727.

70 Derrida, Specters, xviii.

71 Ibid., 161.

72 Nicola Bown, Carolyn Burdett, and Pamela Thurschwell, "Introduction" in The Victorian Supernatural, ed. Nicola Bown, Carolyn Burdett, and Pamela Thurschwell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12. In their introduction, Bown, Burdett, and Thurschwell indict "the metaphorical supernatural" for "unify[ing] and flatten[ing] out the supernatural: [such theories] move too seamlessly over the supernatural into what it signifies" (10, 12). They proceed to ask: "How might we historicise a central aspect of the fascination of the supernatural—the desire to confound history and turn back time, to eschew the material world in favour of an ethereal, magic realm?" (12).

73 Derrida, Specters, 4.

74 Luckhurst, Trauma Question, 93.

75 Roger Luckhurst, "Contemporary London Gothic and the Limits of the 'Spectral Turn,'" Textual Practice 16, no. 3 (2002): 535. The Gothic is arguably the most common term used to describe geographies (textual or other) in which the past somehow intrudes upon the present. It is therefore not surprising that the Gothic has also seen a revival in scholarship over the past two decades. With some exceptions (e.g., Jesse Alemán's essay in this Reader), it predominantly explains an Anglo-American and European understanding of haunting and haunted experience. As we have explained in Popular Ghosts: The Haunted Spaces of Everyday Culture, although ghosts are a staple of the Gothic, which can itself be seen as haunted in that it constantly invokes its own generic origins in order to seek its definition, a conflation of the Gothic and the spectral should be avoided. María del Pilar


77 Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (1995; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). As with all volumes of this type, the process of selection for *The Spectralities Reader* was guided by our interests and familiarities, as well as by the constraints of the book format and factors of language and cost.

78 Barthes writes: “in the cinema, no doubt, there is always a photographic referent, but this referent shifts, it does not make a claim in favor of its reality, it does not protest its former existence; it does not cling to me: it is not a specter.” *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (1980; London: Vintage, 2000), 89.
