My Papers

(This page is under construction: some papers aren't linked yet—I'll put them up when I find them)

1054 and All That
The Basilica, July 2011

Abba, Father: Inclusive Language and Theological Salience
Faith and Philosophy Vol. 26, No. 4 (July 1999)
Questions about the use of “inclusive language” in Christian discourse are trivial but the discussion which surrounds them raises an exceedingly important question, namely that of whether gender is theologically salient--whether Christian doctrine either reveals theologically significant differences between men and women or prescribes different roles for them. Arguably both conservative support for sex roles and allegedly progressive doctrines about the theological significance of gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation are contrary to the radical teaching of the Gospel that in Christ there is no male or female, Greek or Jew, slave or free man.

Access to Information: The Virtuous and Vicious Circles of Publishing
APA Computers and Philosophy Newsletter, forthcoming
Textbook anthologies once served an important purpose. Currently however most do not facilitate access to information and are not cost-effective. The same is true of hardcopy journals. Initially journals democratized the Republic of Letters. They made information that had previously circulated amongst a small coterie of scholars through private correspondence available to a wider audience. Now Web publishing is cheap and efficient: researchers can make their work available without the help of journal publishers.Traditional publishing is not outdated and never will be. The book as we know it is a very efficient vehicle for conveying information. Codices knocked out scrolls in the way that quartz watches superceded mechanical watches and CDs replaced records. But Kindle will never knock out traditional books and the Internet will never replace magazines or newspapers. For most purposes, hardcopy books, magazines and newspapers add value and are preferred by consumers. For some purposes however hardcopy publications are not efficient and will likely, in the end, go the way of the scroll, the mechanical watch and the vinyl record.

Adaptive Preference
Social Theory and Practice, January 2007
Martha Nussbaum argues that preference welfarism, the doctrine that a person’s good consists in the satisfaction of her informed desires, fails to explain our intuitions in cases of “adaptive preference,” where the preferences of individuals in deprived circumstances are formed in response to their restricted options. Intuitively, it is better for individuals to get what they want than to adjust their wants to be satisfied by what they can get. Preference welfarism however cannot mark this difference as morally significant. I argue , first, that given a reasonable account of preference as it figures in utilitarian accounts, cases of the sort she describes are not examples of adaptive preference and do not undermine the preference utilitarian’s account of what is good for people. The problem is not, as Nussbaum suggests, that the preferences of deprived individuals have been “distorted” but rather that they are not satisfied.

Are We Rational Self-Interested Choosers?
Dagbladet Informacion (November 2006).

Choice Preference and Utility
Metaphilosophy Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1995)
Christina Sommers chides “gender feminists” for ignoring what women actually want in order to promote what they believe women ought to want. Sommers, however, ignores the crucial distinction between what women choose, given their current alternatives and what women would choose if their options were less restrictive. The costs, benefits and risks of pursuing the same goals are different for women than they are for men, consequently women, acting as rational, self-interested and informed choosers will naturally make different choices from their equally rational, self-interested and informed male counterparts. The flaws in Sommers’ defense of what she takes to be commonsense about real women’s real desires are, first, her failure to distinguish between what people choose, given the way things are, and what people would prefer all other things being equal and secondly, her proclivity for talking about desires and aversions, rather than preference rankings. Arguably, even if in making “traditional” choices women are doing the best they can for themselves in the circumstances, many would prefer to make their choices in different circumstances.

Center for the Study of Ethics in Society Vol 3, No. 4 (April, 1990)
The suggestion that women act against their own interests because they are either coerced or brainwashed by their oppressors, is seriously misleading. In supporting traditional sex roles women, as well as men, are act as rational, self-interested choosers whose choices, though intended to optimize their chances of a good outcome, bring about a state of affairs which is less than optimific for all concerned. Women, in short, are caught in a game of Prisoner's Dilemma, a game in which, paradoxically, the result of everyone's free and rational choice is a state of affairs that no player would freely or rationally choose.

Dilemmas of Multiculturalism
The Monist January 2012
I was born here…How many generations does it take to stop mentioning my origin?

------Nadir Dendoune
Most contemporary societies are ethnically and culturally diverse. Responding to diversity
is a challenge—for the United States, a “nation of immigrants,” for post-colonial states of the
global south, cobbled together from diverse ethnic groups, and for European nations experiencing
mass immigration.

Eucharist as Icon
Presence as ordinarily understood requires spatio-temporal proximity. If however Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is understood as spatio-temporal proximity it would take a miracle to secure multiple location and an additional miracle to cover it up so that the presence of Christ wherever the Eucharist was celebrated made no empirical difference. And, while multiple location is logically possible, such metaphysical miracles—miracles of distinction without difference, which have no empirical import—are problematic. I propose an account of Eucharist according to which Christ is indeed really and objectively present in the religiously required sense, without benefit of metaphysical miracles.

Eucharist: Metaphysical Miracle or Institutional Fact
International Journal of Philosophy of Religion, forthcoming
Presence as ordinarily understood requires spatio-temporal proximity. If however Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is understood in this way it would take a miracle to secure multiple location and an additional miracle to cover it up so that the presence of Christ where the Eucharist was celebrated made no empirical difference. And, while multiple location is logically possible, such metaphysical miracles—miracles of distinction without difference, which have no empirical import—are problematic. I propose an account of Eucharist according to which Christ is indeed really and objectively present in the religiously required sense, without benefit of metaphysical miracles. According to the proposed account, which draws upon Searle’s discussion of “social ontology” in The Construction of Social Reality and The Making of the Social World, the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is an institutional fact. I argue that such an account satisfies the requirements for a real presence doctrine.

Ex Ante Desire and Post Hoc Satisfaction
in Keim Campbell, J., M. O'Rourke, and H. Silverstein. Time and Identity: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 7. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2008
L. W. Sumner argues that the informed desire satisfaction account of welfare is unsatisfactory because, since desires precede the states of affairs that satisfy them, satisfying desires may fail to satisfy their agents. I argue that the temporal gap between our desires and the states of affairs that satisfy them poses no special problem for the desire theory. Even if getting what we want fails to satisfy us, we are ceteris paribus better off for having got it.

Feminism and Christian Ethics
Anglican Theological Review Vol. LXXVII, No. 3 (Summer 1995)
I shall argue that the only clearly objectionable aspects of Christianity from the point of view of a reasonable feminism are claims to the effect that men and women have different duties in virtue of gender alone. I shall suggest that revisionary projects including the promotion of inclusive language are questionable. Finally I shall argue that attempts to reconstruct Christian theology and restructure the church in order to accommodate a style of behavior, way of knowing and moral “voice” thought to be characteristic of women’s experience is detrimental to women’s interests.

Fool’s Paradise
presented at at the SCP Pacific, February 2007
Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment is generally taken to make a compelling, if not conclusive, case against philosophical hedonism. I argue that it does not and, indeed, that regardless of the results, it cannot provide any reason to accept or reject either hedonism or any other philosophical account of wellbeing since it presupposes preferentism, the desire-satisfaction account of wellbeing. Preferentists cannot take any comfort from the results of such thought experiments because they assume preferentism and therefore cannot establish it. Neither can anyone else, since only a preferentist should accept the terms of the thought experiment.

Freedom That Matters
Ideologues of the American Dream doctrine assume that state intervention aimed at providing social safety nets for citizens and reducing economic inequality, restricts freedom and undermines individual opportunity. This assumption is the result of empirical misinformation and, more fundamentally, a conceptual mistake. Robust empirical data indicate that economic equality, far from stifling initiative or undermining opportunity, is conducive to social mobility.

Gender Conscious
Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 18, No. 1 (2001)
Integration, has got a good deal of bad press in recent years. Feminists and spokesmen for racial and ethnic minorities express concern that the integrationist agenda requires women and members of minorities to divest themselves of features of their "identities" in order to approximate a restrictive white male ideal which should not be a requirement for fair treatment and social benefits. I argue that this concern is unwarrented and that "Integration" with respect to gender, as I shall understand it, is overall more conducive to the happiness of both men and women than what I shall call "Diversity."

Globalism and International Development: The Ethical Issues
Broadview Press, forthcoming late 2012.

Has Feminist Philosophy Lost Contact With Women?
APA Feminism and Philosophy Newsletter (Fall 1993)
I should like therefore to consider some ways in which analytic philosophers can use their expertise and professional status to promote the goals of feminism--because this is what I believe “doing philosophy as a feminist” comes to.

How Bad is Rape?
Hypatia (Summer, 1987)
I argue that being compelled to do routine work is to be seriously harmed and indeed that the pink-collar work that most women in the labor force do is more harmful to women than rape.

How Bad is Rape? II
Philosophy of Sex, Raja Halwani, ed., forthcoming

If p then it has always been the case that it would be the case that p
Chronos (2006)

In Defense of Proselytizing
Religious Studies 36 (2000)
In Ethics in the Sanctuary, Margaret Battin argues that traditional evangelism, directed to promoting religious belief, practice, and affiliation, that is proselytizing, is morally questionable to the extent that it involves unwarranted paternalism in the interests of securing other-worldly benefits for potential converts. I argue that Christian evangelism is justified in order to make the this-worldly benefits of religious belief and practice available to everyone, to bring about an increase in religious affiliation for the purpose of providing a more supportive social environment for Christians, and to promote the survival of the institutional Church, which benefits Christians and non-Christians alike by maintaining church property, providing access to church buildings and doing liturgy visibly and publicly for the sake of all people.

Is Homosexuality Sexuality?
Theology (May 2004)
I argue on utilitarian grounds that while traditional constraints on heterosexual activity, including the prohibition of pre-marital sex and divorce may be justified by appeal to purely secular principles, no comparable prohibitions are justified as regards homosexual activity. Homosexuality is in this respect “outside the law”: to the extent that restrictions on sexual activity are warranted, homosexuality is not sexuality. I argue further that although homosexual activity is morally innocuous, the Church should not at this time ordain openly active homosexuals or bless same-sex unions.

Left Libertarianism: What’s In It For Me?
San Diego Law Review 43/6 (2006)
Left Libertarians hold, first, that agents fully own themselves and secondly, that natural resources belong to everyone in some egalitarian manner. Peter Vallentyne argues that while discrimination is not intrinsically unjust on Left Libertarian grounds and state prohibitions against it are, it is nevertheless unjust for the state (and many private individuals) to take no steps to offset the negative effects of systematic discrimination. I argue that, contrary to Vallentyne’s assumption, most significant discrimination on the basis of sex and race, particularly in employment and housing, is rational—and that that is why, on consequentialist grounds, intervention by the state or other agencies is warranted. In the final section I pose some questions about whether the Left Libertarian account can either provide a rationale for promoting greater equality in opportunities for wellbeing and whether programs that are consistant with Left Libertarian notions of full property ownership and self-ownership can contribute significantly either to promoting greater equality of opportunity or greater wellbeing.

Liberal Feminism
Since Alison’s Jaggar’s influential work in constructing a taxonomy of feminist positions, “liberal feminists” have been taken to support a fundamentally libertarian political agenda based on the assumption that formal equality under the law suffices to eliminate male-female inequality and that additional state-supported programs which serve women’s interests, including affirmative action, the provision of child-care, family leave and the like, are unwarranted. In addition, some feminist philosophers suggest that liberal feminists "valorize" masculinity, are indifferent to the devaluation of female-identified work and that one of our fundamental goals is to establish, by a priori methods if necessary, that there are no gender-based psychological differences. These assumptions are false. In fact, many of us who are liberal feminists to the extent that we believe that women’s interests are best served by working toward a state of affairs where the expectations and opportunities for men and women are the same, do not hold these views. I shall argue that the real fault line between liberal feminists and the majority of feminist philosophers who are unsympathetic to this view marks a divergence in our understanding of the causes of gender inequality and, consequently, disagreement about the priorities of feminist political action.

Life Adjustment and Life-Improvement
Presented at the APA Pacific, March 2008
Preferentists hold that preference-satisfaction alone contributes to well-being. If preferentism is true it seems to follow that ceteris paribus modifying a person’s preferences to be satisfied by what is on offer should be as good as improving the circumstances of her life to satisfy her preferences. This is a hard saying. We are skeptical about life-adjustment programs intended to reconcile individuals who live under oppressive conditions to their lot: intuitively, social improvement and political liberation are better than brainwashing or other interventions aimed at changing such individual’s preferences to be satisfied by what is on offer. Critics suggest that no subjective account of well-being, whether preferentist or hedonist, can explain our intuitions in these cases: unless we recognize that some states of affairs are objectively more conducive to well-being than others we cannot account for our conviction that life-adjustment is not the moral equivalent of life-improvement. Can we accommodate this conviction without signing onto an objective account of well-being? I argue that we can, if we grant that the satisfaction of (actual and possible) preferences at non-actual possible worlds contributes to well-being.

Meet the Meat: So Where's the Beef?
presented at the APA Pacific Division Meeting, March 2005
Preferentism is the doctrine that "in deciding what is good and what is bad for a given individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own preferences." If preferentism is true then it would seem to follow that modifying a person's preferences so that they are satisfied by what is on offer should be as good as improving the circumstances of her life to satisfy her preferences. Our intuitive response to stories of life-adjustment through brainwashing, psychosurgery and the like suggests otherwise. I sketch a broadly preferentist account drawing upon Sen's (non-preferentist) capability approach that resists such putative counterexamples.

Parental Leave
The purpose of treating men and women differently on the assimilationist account is to bring about a situation in which men and women can be, in important respects, the same. The goal is a state of affairs in which the costs and benefits of undertaking a policy of action are the same for men and women. On this account the problem which affirmative action and other policies characteristic of liberal feminism is that they do not go far enough: to enable women to behave like their male colleagues on the job, adjustments will have to be made in the organization of society outside the labor market.

Parties, Performances and Perfect Fakes (html)
presented at the SCP, January 13, 2012

Parties, Performances and Perfect Fakes (powerpoint)
presented at the SCP, January 13, 2012

Paul Horwich: Reflections on Meaning
International Philosophical Quarterly 46/3 September, 2005

Permanent Possibilities of Preference Satisfaction
On Happiness. The World Knowledge Press (《幸福的奥秘》         世界知识出版社               北京      2010年1月); Beijing; January, 2010
What is the Good Life? This is the oldest philosophical question and perhaps the most important one. It is the question of what is of intrinsic prudential value, that is, the question of what is in and of itself good for us from the purely self-interested point of view. I defend a version of preferentism according to which well-being is the satisfaction of our informed desires. Preferentism is a subjective theories according to which there is no value “in the world” so to speak or good as such. What is good for us is simply getting what we want—whatever it is.

Encyclopedia of Global Justice, Deen Chatterjee, ed. Springer, 2011
Consequentialist accounts are traditionally divided into hedonistic theories, desire (or preferentist) theories and objective list theories according to what they take to be the defining feature of the consequences of action which are to be pursued, that is, what they take to be of intrinsic value. Preferentism, also known as the desire theory, is a subjectivist account of value according to which well-being is identified with preference-satisfaction. Well-being on this account is the satisfaction of our intrinsic preferences, our attaining those states we want for their own sake rather than merely as means in order to achieve ulterior ends.

Sabellianism Reconsidered
Sophia (October 2002)
Sabellianism, the doctrine that the Persons of the Trinity are roles that a single divine being plays either simultaneously or successively, is commonly thought to entail that the Father is the Son. I argue that there is at least one version of Sabellianism that does not have this result and meets the requirements for a minimally decent doctrine of the Trinity insofar as it affirms that each Person of the Trinity is God and that the Trinity of Persons is God while maintaining monotheism without undermining the distinctness of Persons

The Experience Machine Deconstructed
Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 15/1 (Spring 2008)
Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment is generally taken to make a compelling, if not conclusive, case against philosophical hedonism. I argue that it does not and, indeed, that regardless of the results, it cannot provide any reason to accept or reject either hedonism or any other philosophical account of wellbeing since it presupposes preferentism, the desire-satisfaction account of wellbeing. Preferentists cannot take any comfort from the results of such thought experiments because they assume preferentism and therefore cannot establish it. Neither can anyone else, since only a preferentist should accept the terms of the thought experiment.

The Gender Tax
The Anglican (December 1998)
The Church has little to offer the growing number of women who no longer play traditional roles in home or workplace. Coming to the Church from a world where there is at least the appearance of min­imizing the significance of gender, we enter a world which is highly sex-segregated and, in addition, women are expected to pay a gender tax: while leadership roles are now open to women, the costs are higher for women who, unlike their male counterparts, are expected to manifest "involvement" by participating in traditional, labor-intensive women's activities

“The Joy of Theology,”
The Basilica vol. 2, issue 3, April 2012

The Market for Feminist Epistemology
The Monist (1994)
The thesis of gender differences in moral reasoning hypothesized by Carol Gilligan who, according to Jaggar, "demonstrated that the categories used to describe the moral development of children in fact fit the development only of boys"[5] [emphasis added] was early shown to be false on empirical grounds. Nevertheless, like a number of other "scientific fictions," including the myth of mother-infant bonding to be considered presently, the myth of women's way of knowing took on a life of its own within the literature, in which feminist theoreticians cited other feminist theoreticians and the highly speculative work of feminist psychoanalysts in support of claims about gender differences which had little or no empirical basis. These requirements are not supposed to impose restrictions on the content of preferences. In fact they do: while a variety of preferences which we might regard as self-destructive, perverse or silly can count as true preferences, the preferentist account does rule out the preference for innocence.

The Multicultural Mystique
Promentheus Books, May 2008

The Trinity: Relative Identity Redux
According to relative identity theories it is possible for objects x and y to be the same F but not the same G—where F and G are sortals, and x and y are Gs as well as Fs. Prima facie, relative identity looks like a perfect fit for the doctrine of the Trinity since it allows us to say that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, each of which is a Trinitarian Person, are the same God (or being) but not the same Person. Nevertheless, relative identity solutions to logic puzzles concerning the doctrine of the Trinity have not, in recent years, been much pursued. Critics worry that relative identity accounts are unintuitive, uninformative or unintelligible—and, in addition, that the most plausible relative identity theories do not circumvent the logical problems that that the doctrine of the Trinity poses. I suggest that the relative identity account is worth a second look and argue that it provides a coherent account of the doctrine of the Trinity.

A New Paradox of Hedonism?
presented at APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 9, 2009

The Problem of the Many: Roache on Cohabitation
presented at Northwest Philosophy Concerence, October 2, 2010

The Virtuous and Vicious Circles of Academic Publishing
Dialogue and Universalism. vol XIX, no. 1-2 (2009)

The Real Presence
Religious Studies, August 2012.
The doctrine that Christ is really present in the Eucharist appears to entail that Christ’s body is not only multiply located but present in different ways at different locations. Moreover, the doctrine poses an even more difficult meta-question: what makes a theological explanation of the Eucharist a “real presence” account?
Aquinas’ defense of transubstantiation in Summa Theologica Part III, Questions 75 – 81 is a philosophical analysis of the real presence doctrine, invoking Aristotelian metaphysics and the machinery of Scholastic philosophy. My aim is not to produce a “rational reconstruction” of Aquinas analysis but rather, taking his discussion as a paradigmatic exposition of the real presence doctrine, to produce a metaphysically innocent alternative.
In the following discussion I propose a metaphysically minimalist version of the real presence doctrine that “saves the phenomena” of religious belief and practice.

Theism and Globalization
Routledge Companion to Theism, Charles Taliaferro, Victoria Harrison and Steward Goetz, eds. September, 2012
Global religious diversity makes it difficult to maintain that any given religion, as traditionally understood, is salvific, of universal interest or capable of being believed with a high degree of conviction. In response, some religious studies scholars  suggest that we revise the content of religion, jettisoning parochial features and supernaturalistic claims. I suggest that instead we abandon traditional assumptions about the significance of religion, recognizing that it is neither salvific nor of universal interest, and that it cannot, and should not, be believed with a high degree of conviction. We should reject theologians’ pious atheism in favor of cynical orthodoxy.

Transworld Egoism, Empathy and the Golden Rule
Advances in Psychology, forthcoming
Intuitively mere possibilities can affect our well-being. Most of us value effective freedom for its own sake: we believe that an abundance of real options, even if we never exercise them, is in and of itself a good thing. The broad preferentist account of well-being accommodates this intuition (Baber, 2010). On this account, merely possible states of affairs can harm or benefit us: the possibility of satisfying our nearby-possible as well as actual preferences may make us better off and the frustration of our preferences at other possible worlds undermines our well-being at the actual world.

Trinity, Filique and Semantic Ascent
Sophia 47/2 July 2008
Christians believe that the Persons of the Trinity are distinct but in every respect equal. We believe also that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father. It is difficult to reconcile claims about the Father’s role as the progenitor of Trinitarian Persons with commitment to the equality of the persons, a problem that is especially acute for Social Trinitarians. I propose a metatheological account of the doctrine of the Trinity that facilitates the reconciliation of these two claims. On the proposed account, “Father” is systematically ambiguous. Within economic contexts, those which characterize God’s relation to the world, “Father” refers to the First Person of the Trinity; within theological contexts, which purport to describe intra-Trinitarian relations, it refers to the Trinity in toto-- thus in holding that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father we affirm that the Trinity is the source and unifying principle of Trinitarian Persons. While this account solves a nagging problem for Social Trinitarians it is theologically minimalist to the extent that it is compatible with both Social Trinitarianism and LatinTrinitarianism, and with heterodox Modalist and Tri-theist doctrines as well. Its only theological cost is incompatibility with the Filioque Clause, the doctrine that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both theFather and the Son—and arguably that may be a benefit.

Two Models of Preferential Treatment for Working Mothers
Public Affairs Quarterly (October 1990)
In recent years, feminists have become disillusioned with what might be called the Assimilationist Strategy--the project of making it more feasible for women to hire others as primary childcare providers in order to maintain the pattern of labor force participation traditionally expected of males. It is suggested rather that we aim to reorganize work in such a way as to make it possible for workers to devote more time and energy to "parenting". I argue that this Non-Assimilationist Strategy is fundamentally contrary to the interests of women in the long run as well as unfair. In particular, I shall argue that extended leaves for childcare are unfair and undesirable: employers are under no obligation to provide them and women, in the interests of promoting equality, ought not to take them.

Virtuous Circles, Vicious Circles and Virtual Books
E-Mentor (February 2, 2009)

What, Me Worry? Cohabitation and the Problem of the Many (powerpoint)
presented at APA Pacific Division Meeting, April 2011

What Women's Ordination Entails
Theology v.CII, no. 806 (March/April 1999)
Opponents of women’s ordination typically suggest that the proposition that women can be priests entails further propositions which supporters either fail to recognise or wrongly fail to regard as objectionable. I suggest that in fact the objectionable doctrines which are alleged to follow from the thesis that women can be priests follow only if we make highly questionable assumptions, including most particularly the controversial assumption that there are theologically significant gender differences. Arguably, the burden of proof is on the opponent of women’s ordination to defend these assumptions

Whatever Floats Your Boat: In Defense of Preferentism
The Philosopher’s Magazine First Quarter 2006

What Kind of Ecumenism Should We Want?
The kind of ecumenism we should want is intercommunion or, more broadly an arrangement in which all people are welcome to use all church facilities, to visit church buildings and participate in liturgy, without doctrinal tests or affiliation requirements. It is not the business of churches to make windows into men’s souls or, arguably, to impose theological tests for participation. Theology is the business of the academy; liturgy is the work of the Church.

Women Don't Blog
In our profession and other academic disciplines blogging has become the new hall talk. Philosophers operate their own blogs, post as members of group blogs, and enter into the discussion of philosophical and professional issues by commenting on posts. Women in the profession however are only half as likely to blog as their male colleagues. Women, I suggest, are reluctant to post because the risks of blogging for women are greater than they are for men and because they are less likely to benefit from assuming risk. If I am correct, gender dynamics in our profession induce women, as rational choosers, to play it safe when it comes to the decision whether to blog and, arguably, in making a range of other far more significant professional decisions.

Worlds, Capabilities and Well-Being
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.ˆvol. 13, no. 4 (2010), pp. 377-392.
Advocates of the Capability Approach hold that the capability, or effective freedom, to attain valued functionings, as well as their actual attainment, contributes to well-being. However not all capabilities contribute to well-being. Martha Nussbaum distinguishes those capabilities which are of value by means of a list of Central Human Functional Capabilities. My aim is to reconstruct the Capability Approach without the objective list. According to my proposed account, Broad Preferentism, preference satisfaction alone—possible as well as actual—is of value. States of affairs contribute to well-being because and to the extent that they satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences, and are fruitful, that is, compatible with a range of further states which satisfy actual or nearby possible preferences. It is the capability of attaining such valued states that makes us better off—where their actual attainment is to be understood as capability to the highest degree. Broad preferentism solves the problem of adaptive preference, which dogs traditional preferentist accounts according to which only the satisfaction of actual preferences contributes to well-being, and which critics cite as a compelling reason to reject preferentism in favor of the Capability Approach. Arguably, we should, ceteris paribus, prefer accounts of well-being which are monistic and subjective and so should prefer broad preferentism to the objective list version of the Capability Approach.