In Fenruary of 1943, as plans for retaking Kiska began, the influential Army Colonel Ray T. Maddocks argued that the less-heavily defended island of Attu should be taken before Kiska, thus reducing the strength of opposition on the latter, if a Aleutian offensive were to be undertaken. Combined with a lack of sufficient naval power and the readiness of the Japanese defenders for a Kiska attack, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved an Attu attack - code-named Operation SANDCRAB - on 1 April. The planning of the invasion was plagued by many difficulties. Personality clashes lead to disorder among the high leadership, only the rugged coastline of the island had been properly mapped out, and the Japanese force defending the island was underestimated by about almost 1,000 troops. It was predicted to take three days to secure the island, even though this was how long it took on the uninhabited islands of Adak and Amchitka. This prediction, however, would be shattered quickly. Incessant fog greatly limited American air strike support. Also, the Japanese commander Colonel Yamasaki Yasuyo had learned of the attack and had ordered his men to the foggy hills rather than facing a superior Allied force on the beach. The date of the landing, commanded by MGEN Brown, was originally set for 7 May, but inclement weather caused it to be pushed back.
        Nevertheless, on 11 May, the only land battle fought on the continent of North America during World War II began as U.S. soldiers totalling around 12,500 men landed in northern Attu at Austin Cove and in the south at Massacre Bay. They were to fight their way to the Japanese strongholds of Holtz Bay and Chichagof Harbor. While the Northern force, which included Alaskan scouts, made steady, if slow, progress, it took the Southern force eight days to work their way out of Massacre Bay. On 13 May all progress was halted. Two days later, MGEN Brown left to petition Kinkaid and DeWitt for more troops. Unhappy with the job he was doing, Kinkaid relieved him of command of the operation. On 23 May, sixteen Japanese bombers attempted to attack U.S. forces on Attu. Five were shot down, amrking the last attempt by the enemy to support their ground troops on the island with air power. By now American troops had grown to 15,000. On 26 May, the 32nd Infantry met with heavy resistance while trying to seize a ridge. Private First Class Joe Martinez took it upon himself to take the enemy out, dying in the effort. For his actions, PFC Martinez was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor posthumously. On 29 May, after killing their wounded with morphine shots and grenades, COL Yamasaki and what remained of his men attacked the American line in an attempt to take their machine guns and ensure their ability to continue to fight. As they came close to taking the position, engineers that had been bivouaced to the area formed a hasty defense and repelled the incessant banzai attacks: the last Japanese offensive of the battle. By the time the island was secured, only thirty of Japan's North Sea Garrison were left alive; most of those who were not killed by U.S. troops took their own lives.
       Finally securing the island on 30 May, Kiska became the only island in the Aleutians no longer in America's control. The forces that fought on Attu were not properly prepared, were in poor condition, and were not equipped for the terrain. Brown received much crticism for this poor adaptation to the environment. The preset timeline of three days was also highly critcized. Finally, a lack of joint communication was cited as leading to the confusion and disorder of the battle.