On 18 October 1867,  Russia handed over their colony of Alaska to the United States. Instrumental in the purchase, Secretary of State William Henry Seward saw the territory as a connection to Asian markets and a chance to put pressure on British Columbia. He saw this as his greatest personal achievement, but realized that it would not be appreciated in his lifetime. To him, holding these territories would lead to control of the Pacific. It was agreed that a display of military force was needed to prove American superiority to the natives that came with the property; there were about 2,000 whites compared to around 25,000 aboriginals. Since the end of the Civil War, the size of army had decreased from its wartime strength of 1.5 million to less than 30,000 soldiers. Accordingly, not much of this already small manpower would be sent to the defense of the new possession. With the main Army base on Kiska Island, there was no garrison assigned to the Aleutians, the closet being Kodiak island. A budget cut in 1870 lead to the close of all bases except the one on Kiska, which itself was closed in 1877. For the next twenty years, the only military presence in Alaska was for geographical surveying. When gold was discovered in the Yukon territory in 1897, American military returned to deal with the threat of disorder due to the rush of people from all over with dreams of quick prosperity. By 1900 there were more than twelve posts set up through the vast territory. In February of 1904, the Russo-Japanese War threatened to complicate matters. Friendly relations had existed with Japan since Commodore Mathew Perry's good will trip in 1853, so the Japanese were confident that we would stay neutral. Further complications arose from our acquisitions of Hawaii and the Philippines, the latter of these by force, however the Japanese still believed that we would not deploy the bulk of our fleet to the Pacific.
        In 1911, the Navy considered three options in case of the need to counter a Japanese attack: first, from the North via the Aleutians to Okinawa; second, an attack from Hawaii or Guam; and finally, up from the Philippines. It was argued that a campaign from the Philippines would take too long and that Kiska was not big enough to be effective and that it was too close to Japan and thus vulnerable to attack. Despite fervent argument from Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who believed that complications that would arise with the Aleutian option could be overcome, the Naval War Board decided to put the main fleet in Hawaii with only a few cruiser scouts alloted to the Aleutians.
        While the First World War put talks of Alaska on the back-burner, Army War College professor R.M. Johnson proposed 20,000 troops be stationed in Hawaii and Alaska to protect against Japanese invasion of the territories. However, in 1922 the Washington Naval Treaty was signed, and in Article XIX of the agreement, the construction of new bases, and even the improvement of existing bases, in Alaska and the Aleutians was forbidden. Even so, as anti-American sentiment grew in the Japanese Navy, Americans began to look at options in the Aleutians. Hector C. Bywater published a paper in 1925 saying that Americans could defeat the Japanese in a war, and that the utilization of the Aleutians would play a key role. Bywater, however, failed to convince people of his point. The American prophet of aviation, Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, was better placed to be influential. BGen Mitchell sought to prove the importance of aviation in future conflicts and secure an independent American air service. Opposed to the Washington treaty, believing that increasing American trade interest in Asia and rampant racism toward Japanese immigrants in the U.S. made a war with Japan inevitable, Mitchell argued that planes flying from the Aleutians could level Tokyo.  Citing Canada's proximity to Alaska as prove that our neighbors would be our natural allies in any plans to fortify that area against a Japanese attack, the pilot organized a test flight to prove the worth of the islands. Unfortunately for Mitchell and other Aleutian advocates, the flight failed to convince anyone. Weather in the area was, at best, bad, and by 1934 Canada was only assured further that it didn't want part in Americans activities in the region. For the time being, the Aleutian Islands would take a back seat to other affairs. (Perras)