In 1978, American President Jimmy Carter deemed the state
of Iran under the Pahlavi regime to be an “Island of stability in one of the most
troubled areas of the world” 1. While
it is true that Iran was not directly engaged in significant regional or world
conflicts during the period from 1921–1979, ‘stability’ is hardly the
appropriate term to characterize Iranian domestic politics of that period. During the years of Pahlavi rule, Iran was
characterized by considerable internal strife, as Iranian society attempted to
adapt to the rapid modernization policies enacted both by Shah Reza Pahlavi and
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. This is particularly true for the twenty years just
prior to the Revolution of 1979. Policies and objectives included Iran’s
Westernization, social reform and great importance was placed on its economic
restructuring. Economic changes under Shah Reza Pahlavi, such as land reform
and fluctuating oil revenues, incited political mobilization among different
sectors of Iranian society and contributed to the revolutionary sentiment. This
essay will attempt to demonstrate that rapid modernization and land reform, in
particular, led to class grievance-a force that became powerful enough to lead
to the resurgence of the Islamist movement in pre-revolutionary Iran.
In order to further
comprehend the fall of the Pahlavi regime, one must account for the history,
events and government policies that preceded the Revolution. The Pahlavis first
acquired power by means of a military coup in 1921, which overthrew and
replaced the weakly operating Qajar Dynasty. Once in power, Reza Shah focused
on rebuilding and strengthening the military and state bureaucracy. He
transferred the control of such institutions as education, administration,
health and the judicial system from the religious ulema, to the state 2.
As this drive for secularization ran counter to the religious objectives
of the ulema, seeds of dissatisfaction sprouted among the clergymen and their
supporters. Despite this opposition, Reza Shah continued to pursue
modernization.
His
twenty-two-year-old son, Mohammed Reza Shah, replaced Reza Shah in 1941. A
significant alteration occurred in regime policy with the installation of the
new king. The system of constitutional monarchy was revived, as it had been
temporarily suspended under Reza Shah’s authoritarian rule. The power of the
Prime Minister and the Parliament was reinstated and continued to grow until
the Shah was nearly ousted and replaced irrevocably by nationalist Prime
Minister, Mohammed Mossadeq. However, in 1953, Mossadeq was overthrown with the
aid of the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This coup can be said to
have demonstrated that the Shah’s popularity was diminishing and that support
for another leader was developing. In spite of this issue, the Pahlavi regime
continued to establish, strengthen and modernize state institutions. One author
writes, “…Iran is a Constitutional Monarchy, ever since the fall of Mossadegh,Shah
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi has exercised unlimited legislative and executive power
in Iran” 3. After this event, there surfaced
little opposition until 1962-3, when the ulema voiced their opposing views
towards the regime’s policies, a topic that will be discussed later in the
essay. In essence, the above points are only concrete palpable indicators of
changes occurring in Iran under the Pahlavis. The underlying effects of these
changes included the growing resistance of certain groups to the regime’s policies,
which was met with less tolerance and even repression by the regime.
One policy, under
Mohammed Reza Shah, drawn to promote rapid modernization, was economic
restructuring. This new objective for Iran was largely focused on the Land
Reform policies he enacted during what was entitled the “White Revolution” of
1962. The Shah’s quest for land reform actually started in 1950, when he
redistributed imperial land holdings to the peasantry. This was later to be
extended to the majority of Iranian estates. However, in 1959 when the
government introduced the first land reform bill to the Parliament, the clergy
met it with a great deal of opposition. In 1960, the leading religious figure,
Ayatollah Borujerdi stated: “...any step limiting the size of landed estates
would be contrary to Islam” 4. In
reaction to the growing hostility towards the regime, the Shah introduced a
policy based on six points,
which would later be
recognized as the White Revolution. One of the six points that was introduced
was the Land Reform Law. Immediately after this proposal, the clergy was
warning that the “government must not lay its hands on the endowed religious
estates” 5. The Shah, however, went forward with
the land redistribution.
The Land Reform
portion of the White Revolution was composed of several different policies that
attempted to deal with past problems of land ownership inequalities. Prior to
land reform in Iran, there existed an estimated " …less than one half of
one percent of the total population {that} owned up to 60% of the land under
cultivation" 6. The regime acknowledged
the problem of inequitable distribution of income in the agricultural sphere.
As a solution to this problem, the regime proposed an objective to break up the
landlord-peasant relationship and transfer ownership of the property to the
cultivator who would work on the land. However, after fifteen years of enacting
this 'revolutionary' Land Reform Program, there was minimal economic success:
"During the ten year period from 1962-1972, agriculture had a growth rate
of only 3.6% a year, and its shares in the Gross National Product (GNP) fell
from about 32% to 16%" 7. The
dramatic drops in the agricultural shares of the GNP demonstrate that while the
blueprint for this policy was egalitarian, it was proving to be inefficient and
non-beneficial. Many Iranians viewed the implementation of the Shah's Land
Reform as poorly planned. The planners had not accounted for a fundamental precondition
to Land Reform, which was a structure that would replace the pre-existing
landlord-peasant relationship. While farmers were encouraged to participate in
state-run farming corporations or to turn their land over to private
agricultural firms, these new agricultural cooperatives required a great deal
of organization and money. Ample attention was not given to ensure that a
functional structure would replace the key roles that had previously been
performed by the landlords. One American Foreign Service officer to Iran
suggests, "…the planners’ focused
on increasing productivity and output in support of the general objectives of
accelerating growth, industrialization, and diversification" 8. Their objectives were centered on
phases that should have come later in the Land Reform process. Consequently,
this ill-defined venture resulted in the demise of a long-standing tradition of
Landlords in Iran and caused many rapid socio-economic changes that the Iranian
society could not adapt to.
One group in particular
that was directly affected by the Land Reform policies was the religious ulema.
As stated earlier, the religious Islamic ulema greatly resisted the removal of
clergy-owned lands, as they had been endowed to the clergy by wealthy religious
believers or by previous kings. The clergy was dependent on these lands as
their political power would be limited over certain constituencies, if they
could no longer distribute money to them. Moreover, the lack of funding
normally derived from their land, would place more pressure on pre-existing
sources of income, principally the Bazaari merchants. The ulema had a financial
relationship with the Bazaaris, who paid their 'zakat' 9
or tithe to the religious institution. The Bazaaris financial resources were
derived from Iran’s commerce and trade sectors.“The bazaar constituted 15% of
the private sector trade and had monopolized 30 per cent of all imports to
Iran” 10
In view of the fact that the Bazaaris were
proving to be somewhat economically self-sufficient and displaying political
independence, the Shah may have felt that they were a source of strong
potential opposition to the establishment. The Shah’s regime had interest in
breaking down the economic power of the Bazaaris, in order to reduce their
“socio-culturally conservative influence throughout society” 11 . In accordance with this interest,
the state-run Rastakhiz party, established a price-controlling campaign in
1976. As a result, the alliance between the clergy and the Bazaaris was
strengthened by the “identification of the Shah as a common enemy determined to
disgrace Islam and the Iranian tradition.” 12 One may argue that the Shah’s regime itself
spurred this opposition of the Bazaaris. In any event, the merchants did not
directly involve themselves in the revolutionary movement. They did, however,
contribute financial support to high-ranking members of the clergy and
especially to Ayatollah Khomeini. Secondly, they financed strikers, which in
effect heightened the revolutionary sentiment and contributed to the downfall
of the regime. Thirdly, they hired youths from such groups as unemployed rural
migrants, for anti-government street demonstrations. Dissatisfaction towards
the regime was manifest in the form of a riot in 1963, yet the government, with
the aid of the army, acted quickly to suppress the riots. These riots serve to
uncover two key points: firstly, the riots were relatively easily absorbed by
the state and thus serve to contrast the weakness of the state in 1978-79,
which could no longer suppress the revolutionary uprisings; and secondly, to
demonstrate that the influence of the ulema spread through such networks as the
bazaar and ultimately underpinned much of the mobilization of specific
revolutionary groups.
The upper class of Iran,
prior to 1978, was also affected by the modernization policies implemented by
the regime. The traditional elite was one section of the upper class that
existed prior to social changes and modifications to Iran's social
institutions. They may have included members of the Crown or certain merchants,
among other people. Another group within the upper class was the
non-traditional elite. With the modernization of Iran, there developed upward
social mobility for members of lower classes, such as bankers, industrialists,
army generals and cabinet ministers. One author writes that the members of the
non-traditional elite were "directly products of-and in turn agents for-
social change and Modernization." 13
Such a statement implies that this group was accruing the benefits of the Shah’s regime. While it is a common generalization that all sectors of the upper class benefited
from the Shah's policies, one subdivision in particular, the landed
aristocrats, ultimately did not. The wealth of this group of Feudal Landlords
resided in the ownership of their ancestral lands. Initially, numerous members from within the sphere of the upper
class supported both the Pahlavi regimes. For this reason, a large number of
the Iranian populace believed that the Iranian parliament was composed of and
represented the interests of the traditional Iranian elites and not the masses.
One Iranian suggests that the makeup of the parliament was “essentially the
same old lion; only its main was bushier” 14
While this is a point that can be speculated, there exists cases in which
landed aristocrats did have close ties with the establishment. Some feudal
landlords, who owned strategic territories, for example, would allow the Shah
to set up informal 'puppet governments' and/or Para-militaries in the area of
their land holdings. Support for the Pahlavi regime among the Landed elites was
more widespread in the 1940s-prior to their being targeted by the Shah’s Land
Reform Program in the 1950s. Many landlords supported the Shah and willingly
gave their land away, while others did so more hesitantly. Kamrava suggests
that:
"…most
landed proprietors either eventually returned
to their feudal
estates or
transformed their feudal privileges into capitalist ones by
becoming urban-based industrialists.
Their potential for opposition
against the regime was
effectively undermined and was instead
redirected into support for
the status quo" 17.
One can argue that Kamrava makes quite a
generalization about the entire group of Feudal Landlords, which is a common
oversight. Firstly, not all lands were returned to their original proprietor,
more often, only small amounts of personally-tilled land were returned;
secondly, Kamrava does not clearly state for what reason this group was
dissatisfied with the poor use of their land and Iran's general economic
breakdown; and thirdly, it is essential to recognize that while many members of
this class were discontented with the Shah's actions, they continued to support
his regime. Great numbers of the Landed Aristocracy had grown accustomed to and
could relate more with the Western values and culture, than they could with the
resurfacing doctrines of the Shia' Islamic groups. The upper class is a group
that serves to demonstrate the essential aspects of class conflict as a result
of perceptions and misperceptions over who was wreaking the benefits of the
established regime. In reality such sub-groups within the upper class, as the
Feudal Landlords, felt the adverse effects of the Shah's economic restructuring
policies.
The working class was also
affected, both socially and economically, by the regime’s attempts at
economically and socially reforming Iran. Similar to the ‘upper class', the
'working class' was not a singular, unified group, but was divided into
sub-classes. One of these groups was created and grew in size as a result of
rural to urban domestic migration. This group was gravely affected by the
government's modernization program, which was increased in the 1970s because of
economic growth. "Between 1965 and 1971, the country's national income had
grown at an average annual rate of 11.1 per cent "18. This economic growth was a
consequence of rapid increases in oil revenues in the 1970s. While some rural
to urban migration had occurred in 1962 as a result of Land Reform, it did not
amount to the great influx of migrants who moved to urban centers during this
period of economic success. However, the oil boom that occurred in 1973-74, met
soon after with a halt in oil revenues in 1975. This dramatic change in the
economic growth of Iran's economy, enhanced the pre-existing challenges that
the rural migrants had to face in the centers. The economic and social
expectations of the migrants had grown in correspondence to the development and
modernization of Iran. However, on arrival to the urban centers, they met with
widespread unemployment and often times, poverty. Many of these migrants were
young adults, who served as unskilled labour workers in construction and were
quite disillusioned by the lack of opportunity in the centers. As there was no
real social safety net to support these migrants, many grew hostile towards the
establishment. One major consequence of rapid urbanization, therefore, was the
formation of new economic classes, which included: "…the landless,
unemployed, and unskilled labourer” 19.
Such social and economic changes, coupled with the disenchantment of the
prevailing Westernization of Iranian culture drove this sector of the working
class to embrace the more familiar and secure aspects of Islam.
In
their attempt to modernize Iran, Westernization and social reform are two other
policies that the Pahlavis introduced. While development of freedom of
determination and other such Western-valued advancements were being made with
these policies, they ultimately contributed to more class grievance. The
Pahlavis based much of their policy-making on the Constitution of 1906, which
attempted to encompass both the
“…tenets of Western liberal democracy, yet make all legal enactments of
parliament subject to strict conformity with the Islamic code” 20. It is evident that the Pahlavis were
intending to uphold two very divergent dogmas: the secularization of social and
political institutions, which ran counter to the traditional system of ruling in
accordance to Islam. The new means of ruling, especially with the introduction
of the White Revolution, would inevitably infringe upon the traditional
jurisdiction of control and authority of the clergy. For instance, education
used to be under the influence of the clergy, until the Pahlavis transferred
this power to the state. Modern education focused on providing skills to work
with policies of state capitalism. This system of schooling created great
unrest among different groups for various reasons. The clergy felt it was
another step which compromised their traditional authority in the social
sphere; frustration grew for such groups as rural migrants, over the cultural
and social Westernization of Iran; and finally, there developed a university
student population that was educated about the West, who felt that their King
advocated many freedoms in his rhetoric, but in practice, did not allow their
voices to be heard in the political process. In addition, the Pahlavi regime
impaired the influence of the Islamic institution within society by changing
the status of women in the public sphere. In 1966, with the intention of
promoting the social status of women, a government-sponsored Women’s
Organization of Iran was established. The regime received a both a great deal
of praise and criticism from the general public who held opposing views about
these
reforms which
attempted to Europeanize their culture.
During the period of Pahlavi rule,
Iranian political and societal structures were severely altered. Changes
included the secularization of many social institutions, and more
significantly, modifications to class conditions, that resulted from economic
restructuring. One essential change occurred with the implementation of the
Land Reform during the White Revolution. This altered the landlord-peasant
relationship, yet did not prove to be a means of efficiently developing the
agricultural sector. Such groups as the religious ulema, Bazaari merchants,
rural migrants and feudal landlords were affected by the Land Reform.
Furthermore, these groups had to face the unstable Iranian economy, because of
fluctuations in the country’s oil income. This created both grievance within
individual classes and conflict between classes, because of perceptions of
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in relation to the regime’s policies. The
disillusionment of most of these groups, which was instigated by the
shortcomings of the Land Reform, was accentuated by rapid Westernization and
social reform. Rural migrants, in particular, could not adapt well to the
reorganization of Iran’s social system and therefore suffered a great deal of
economic and cultural disorder. All the while, the force of the ulema, which
has historically been a tool for social change, was upholding much of the
revolutionary mobilization. Islam provided comforting rhetoric, which promoted
stability for the vulnerable masses, which had suffered years of economic and
social uncertainty under the Shah. Bureaucratic inefficiencies deepened as a
result of the Shah’s desire to obtain
the agreement of both the state and the religious ulema on bureaucratic issues.
As a result, support was strengthened for the potentiality of Islamic ruling.
In addition, the lack of foresight in the Land Reform program and the maturing
desire for self-determination by the populace under the Shah’s authoritarian
monarchy, contributed to a growing resistance movement. Thus, inter-class
conflicts and intra-class grievances, resulted in the expansion of the
historically influential support base of the Shia’ Islamic force. What was
often considered a dormant or subdued religious group under the power of the
Pahlavis, actually thrived through a sort of undercurrent. Islam resurfaced
politically and advocated a revolution that drew members from across class strata.
The powerful Islamic body with the mass support of the Iranian populace,
overthrew a weakly functioning Pahlavi state and ultimately caused the downfall
of the latest Monarchy in Iran.
Ahmad, E., ed., Race and Class: The Iranian Revolution, vol.11,
London: The Russell Press Ltd., 1979.
Aryanpur-Kashani, A., The Pocket Persian-English Dictionary.,
Tehran: Amir Kabir Publishing Corporation, 1996.
Hoveyda, F., The Fall of the
Shah. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson Limited, 1979.
Hussain, A., Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter-Revolution. London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985.
Jazani, B., Capitalism
and Revolution in Iran. London:
Iran Committee, 1980.
Kamrava, M., Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil.,
London: Routledge, 1990.
Miklos, J., The Iranian
Revolution and Modernization, National Security Essay Series 83-2,
Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983.
Nirumand, B., Iran: The New Imperialism in Action, New York:
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1Ahmad, E., ed., Race and Class: The Iranian Revolution, vol.11 (London: The Russell Press Ltd., 1979), p.3.
2Kamrava, M., Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil (London: Routledge , 1990), p.14.
3 Nirumand, B., Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p.98.
4Miklos, J., The Iranian Revolution and Modernization, National Security Essay Series 83-2 (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1983), p. 29.
5 Ibid., p.31.
8Ibid., p.35.
9 Singh, K., Iran: Quest for Security (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Ltd., 1980), p.370.
10Hussain, A., Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter-Revolution (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1985), p.114.
11 Kamrava, Revolution in Iran, p.121.
12 Ibid., p.121.
13 Ibid., p.114.
14Miklos, Iranian Revolution and Modernization, p.29.
17 Kamrava, Revolution in Iran, p.119.
18 Ibid., p.105.
19Ibid., p.111.
20 Miklos, Iranian Revolution and Modernization, p.25.