Dependency theory: continuities and discontinuities in development studies

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When Coleridge tried to define beauty, he returned always to one deep thought: beauty, he said, is “unity in variety.” Science is nothing else than the search to discover unity in the wild variety of nature [emphasis mine]—or more exactly, in the variety of our experience.


Interpretations in this book attempt to characterize, in a general manner, the history of that diversity [i.e. diversity of domestic conditions, of local class structures, state organization, and of the timing and mode of insertion into the global system]. Of course, there are common factors in capitalism which affect all economies under consideration and which constitute the starting point of the analysis. But it is the diversity within unity [emphasis mine] that explains historical process.

Introduction

Currently, the field of development is in disarray. One of its most important sub-fields, development economics, has run into difficulties because of both empirical and normative difficulties: empirical difficulties due to the failure to correctly predict which countries would develop and which would not, normative difficulties because the emphasis of economic development studies expanded from an exclusive focus on growth to include questions of distribution and equity.

Theories developed in political science and sociology suffered too, but here the reason lay no so much in explanatory defects of the theories as in the simple failure to agree upon what was important—e.g., mass participation, democracy, capacity of the government to direct social change, structural differentiation, equilibrium, etc. Only anthropology, possibly because of its suspicion of grand theory on the one hand, and its relative distance from governmental forces on the other, was able to maintain any appearance of continuity.

These intellectual changes, of course, had a material base. The decline of the cold war made talk of a "third world" less politically pressing. The rise of oil-rich countries, along with a substantial group of newly industrializing countries competing with the advanced countries, pointed to important differentiations among less developed countries. Thus, although development and underdevelopment were clearly major problems in the late seventies, they were problems that had dropped a peg or two on the political agenda.

To all of this we should perhaps concur with Wallerstein's "Modernization: Requiescat in Pace." Nevertheless, in this paper, I shall review two recent books which attempt to make sense of the processes of development and underdevelopment. In so doing, I shall try to raise some general issues related to development theory, and to probe the possibilities for progress in what has become a stagnant field.

It is a sad irony that recent interest in dependency theory in the United States and in the English-speaking world in general has taken place without access to most of the important Latin American works. This had two unfortunate consequences. First, because it eliminated much of the complex material on the domestic structure of dependency, it had the effect of exaggerating the importance of the external forces driving development and underdevelopment. Inevitably the forces focused upon were those describing the phase characteristics of international capitalism: mercantile, industrial, commercial, corporate, etc. The operation of the local society (i.e., national

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I have benefited from the comments of my colleagues John McCamant, Peter Van Ness, and referees for *International Organization*.

and subnational units) was simply derivative of these great laws of global change. Second (a logical corollary to the first point), this focus on the external forces affecting dependent societies led to a neglect of the complex, and often very influential, internal anatomy of dependency. This has left the impression with many English-speaking scholars that dependency reflects nothing more than a bad case of external reliance—a condition which holds when a country depends on another for some crucial inputs needed to complete its economic cycle. To show that this interpretation of dependency theory is still very much alive, one has only to read the recent article by Tony Smith in *World Politics.* Smith’s major criticism of dependency theory is that it subordinates an analysis of parts to the whole and, in so doing “…deprive[s] local histories of their integrity and specificity, thereby making local actors little more than the pawn of outside forces.” While this may be an adequate characterization of Wallerstein’s world systems analysis or Andre Gunder Frank’s*’* stark version of dependency theory, it is certainly not a fair representation of the work of other theorists of dependent development.

The recent publication in English of *Dependency and Development in Latin America* by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, and translated by Marjory Mattingly Urquidi, will go a long way toward placing in proper perspective this “externalization” of the forces behind the dependency situation. This is not to say that external forces are unimportant in their analysis but rather that there is a parallel set of domestic configurations that must be taken into account. These latter forces must not be seen simply as competing for influence with the external ones but rather as criss-crossing and fusing with them in complicated though not mysterious ways. The authors see as one of their central tasks the unravelling of the forces which cause a uniform global capitalism to be associated with such vastly different results in various socio-political settings.

The nearly simultaneous publication of Peter Evans’ *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in Brazil* offers an important case study, within the Brazilian context, with enlightening similarities and contrasts to the Cardoso and Faletto book. The book provides us with the fruit of ten years of research by a sensitive observer of the Brazilian scene and it admirably combines a closeness to subject matter with a broadly

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3 Ibid., p. 257.


5 This book is not new and the 1978 date applies only to the English translation. The book was written between 1965 and the first months of 1967. It was published in 1971 under the title, *Dependencia y desarrollo en Americana Latina* (Siglo Veintiuno Editors, SA, 1971). The English version is an expanded and amended version of the Spanish edition. Obviously, Peter Evans has read and profited from the writings of Cardoso and Faletto.
insightful comparative eye. Indeed, there is a kind of Schumpeterian quality surrounding the book, relying as it does on a mix of historical insights, comparative contrasts, and statistical data (though not statistical testing). Both books are important and reading them will deepen and broaden our understanding of the literature on dependent development.

Brief overview of the two books

The Cardoso-Faletto book, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, is broadly focused, both in terms of the number of countries examined and its historical reach. The book draws on material from Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and more selectively, from other countries. The book is also a chronological *tour d'horizon*, attempting to explain processes of development in Latin America from colonial times to the present. The cohesiveness of the analysis is provided by the historical spread of capitalism and its interactions with domestic society and politics.

The authors have provided a very thoughtful special preface to the English edition of the book, a careful reading of which is important for a full understanding of the balance of the book. In it they carefully describe their methodological approach, which is more or less implicit in the bulk of the text, and explain in some detail how they attempt to use an analysis which is simultaneously historical, structural, and dialectical. For those interested primarily in the approach of dependency theory (Cardoso and Faletto do not generally use the word theory), rather than a rich, historical interpretation resting on that approach, this chapter may be the most important one in the book.

The substantive portion of the book begins with Chapter 3, "The Period of Outward Expansion," then moves to a detailed examination of the social and political changes accompanying development, how insertion of the dependent economy into the global capitalist system involved the participation of limited groups, such as commercial classes tied to the export sector at first, then how this gradually broadened to include participation of the urban middle classes and the industrial bourgeoisie. Finally, they document how the period of import-substitution, which grew up in the aftermath of the 1929 depression, gave way to a "new" period which saw the internationalization of productive forces occurring in Latin America. In all of this, the book succeeds in keeping domestic, societal forces as clearly in focus as the global dynamics of capitalism. Indeed, the book is primarily about Latin American society, its differentiation into social groups, and how these groups figure into the interplay of national and international interests.

*Dependent Development*, by Peter Evans, is a more focused book both in terms of the countries examined and the breadth of the processes explained. Evans focuses on just one country, Brazil, and within Brazil, on the internal
structure of its elite, primarily the business elite but also the top segments of the state apparatus. This should not mislead us since the book is anything but a technical report on interviews with corporate managers and owners. Evans’ analysis and interpretation are admirably comprehensive, and the presentation of his fascinating interview findings are always sensitively positioned within a context in which Brazil’s social, political, and economic composition figure prominently.

The methodology relied upon is diverse and incorporates elite interviews along with objective information, statistical data, and a careful reading of the historical record. The use of business journals, not as the last word, but as a way of incorporating fragmented pieces of information into a more comprehensive picture, is illuminating. In general, the plurality of methodological angles used to approach the problem provides a stimulating example of “convergent operationalism”—a methodological virtue often praised but seldom followed.

Why was Brazil chosen for study? Evans did not want a country which had been only superficially touched by the logic of dependent development, or one in which this logic had not reached an advanced form—e.g., one in which trade relations primarily characterized dependency. If dependency is defined “as a situation in which the rate and direction of accumulation are externally conditioned” (p. 27), then one is interested in “cases where capital accumulation and diversified industrialization of a more than superficial sort are not only occurring in a peripheral country, but are dominating the transformation of its economy and social structure” (p. 32).

Obviously, not all less developed countries are in this category. On the contrary, only a select few have entered this stage of development. Into this stage, which is characterized by an alliance between domestic and international capital, we might place Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, perhaps Nigeria (though there could be strenuous objections here) and, from the periphery of Europe—Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia. Whatever the differences among these countries, and there are many, the common elements are the dynamic patterns of industrial growth and their close integration with the international capitalist system. To the academic left,

these countries form a "semi-periphery" between the rich and poor, while to many analysts in the developed world, they are "newly industrializing countries," held up as the success stories of the 1960s and 1970s. But, by whatever label, these countries provide a fertile laboratory in which to study the successes and failures, opportunities and limits, harmonies and contradictions of dependent, capitalist development.

**Dependency and mainstream development theories**

The reception by the English-speaking world of these two books under review is likely to be heavily influenced by its perception of what I will call "mainstream development theories," for want of a better term. Of course mainstream theory does not constitute a cohesive intellectual statement; it itself has several roots and expressions. Modern development theory in the United States was a reaction to the institutionalists, whose intellectual categories were supplied by the roster of important Western institutions: courts, executives, bureaucracies, legislatures, political parties, etc. Needless to say, few of these categories had much utility when one shifted the analysis to less developed countries. For this reason alone, the functionalist movement stimulated by Gabriel Almond was a major step forward.

There were also political roots to the rise of development theory. Academic interest in theories of development did not emerge on a significant scale until after World War II, and in particular, until after European economies were rebuilt and West Germany reintegrated into the Western Alliance system. Of course, the rapid decolonization of the British, French, and Dutch empires was important too. Now the world had many "new nations," a term almost a synonym for less developed countries, and with the form, if not the content, of statehood, they became legitimate objects of development programs by metropolitan and non-metropolitan countries alike. Under the influence of cold war thinking, the idea of a "third world" sprung up, next to the communist world and the western world.

Given the proliferation of development studies during the last twenty-five to thirty years, we must remind ourself of the novelty of this field. One respected development economist tells us that "until 1950 there had been little serious thinking on the growth prospects of 'backward areas.'"

Development theory, once it emerged, took many different forms. There were the functional requisites of Almond and Coleman, tasks that all political

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1 For an excellent book of this genre, see Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950, revised ed.).


systems had to perform if they were to survive; there were Parsonian evolutionary universals, and a further specified list of requisites provided by Marion Levy. Whether these functional requisites described powerful theoretical generalizations about societies or whether they simply stipulated the definitional criteria for identifying societies is not clear; nevertheless, the impact of structural-functional analysis was powerful.

At the same time, and partly influenced by the functional approach, a number of scholars writing in connection with the Social Science Research Council came out with an influential set of books which demonstrated the continued centrality of political institutions: Political Parties and Political Development, Bureaucracy and Political Development, and Communications and Political Development. The "crises" approach, too, was influential. According to this development school, all societies faced basically the same set of environmental challenges, which had to be met and overcome—penetration, legitimacy, identity, participation, and distribution. The path of political development was one of encouraging the growth of institutions, cultural beliefs and attitudes, and patterns of political behavior conducive to a successful management of these crises. Despite the natural affinities between the crisis approach and the functional requisites approach (a function is merely the name for a pattern of activity that solves some problem; since crises are problems in extremis, successful resolution of crises can be viewed in functional terms), the two rarely came together.

There is another body of development literature which centers on a syndrome of cultural and psychological traits associated with development.

15 The primary exception to this generalization is the book by Gabriel A. Almond, Scott C. Flanagan, and Robert J. Mundt, Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973). In the introductory essay in this volume, Professor Almond outlines five phases of a system's development and suggests a distinct conceptual approach for each. He suggests the systems-functional approach for the first phase while later phases, characterized by crises, call for a choice or decision-theoretic perspective (pp. 24–25). While this formulation does not establish a theoretical integration between the concepts of crisis and function, it does promote a broad historical sequencing of them.
It shifts from the macro to the micro level and refers to "modern man" or "the modern personality." What is the modern personality and does it make sense to speak of it as a distinct personality type? In answering this question, a list of traits is invoked: mental flexibility, willingness to take risks, psychic mobility, ability to defer gratifications, and above all, pragmatism—a willingness to compromise and to stand not too firmly on principle. One imagines a fluid, almost protean person, not too rooted in tradition, alive to the desirability and possibility of change.

Finally, there are the sociological theories of development— theories that have a grounding in nineteenth century sociology in the works of Maine, Spencer, Comte, and Durkheim. Along with Marxian interpretations of history, this branch of historical sociology can be called "progressive" in the sense that it sees forces as moving historical change in a consistent and desirable direction. These scholars did not provide a theory of development per se, but instead deduced a theory of development from a general theory about society. The polarities defining the end points between which societies move are feudal society, based on heroic-military values and industrial society, based on commercial-bourgeois values. Since historical forces were pushing inexorably in the direction of industrialism, these sociologists drew optimistic conclusions.

Alejandro Portes is quite right in arguing that social evolutionism did not die out in the twentieth century; rather the continuity of evolutionary theory was maintained by compressing many dualities into a single bipolar theme: Durkheim’s mechanical-organic, Toennies’ Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, Redfield’s folk-urban, and Parson’s five pattern variables—each one a bipolar type.

The dependency approach

What is remarkable about all of the above approaches to development is how little they contribute to constructing explanations of change based on factors residing in the external environment. As such, at the outset there is very little similarity between mainstream theories and dependency theory. True, some broad points of contact exist (trade-led models of growth come to mind), but by and large dependency theory represents a distinct approach to development. At the most general level, it may provide a critique of other

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19 My colleague Peter Van Ness has pointed out to me that perhaps this state of affairs is not so curious, given that the cluster of variables under the label imperialism did not exist for many of these authors.
development theories, but it is the kind of critique that one draws out by implication rather than by explicit argument.

Latin American dependency theory is a native construction. In terms of its intellectual genealogy, evolutionary coherence, working assumptions, research programs, and policy goals it stands on its own. While other studies focus primarily on domestic causes of development, dependency focuses on internal and external forces (including their interactions). While others take the nation-state as the exclusive unit of analysis (indeed development is almost synonymous with nation-building and state-building), dependency theorists introduce corporate actors and social classes as important additional units. While others see their theories as intellectual constructions which attempt to explain reality, dependency theorists attempt to use their ideas to change reality. Finally, while mainstream theories of development see countries presently on the way to development following the same historical path as the early modernizers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, dependency theorists see today’s historical path as altered by the very modernization of the earlier modernizers.

In all of these senses, dependency theory is not a reconstruction of traditional development theory but a qualitatively new departure. If anything, it is closer in spirit to the work of Gerschenkron (because of the importance of timing considerations) and to Barrington Moore (because of the methodology of contextual historical analysis).20

The importance of the two books

Dependency and Development in Latin America and Dependent Development are important contributions to the literature on development both in terms of their intrinsic merits as well as for their timely appearance in filling a huge gap in the contemporary literature. If these books are to stimulate our interest, reorient our thinking, and direct our research, they will have to be read sympathetically, which is not to say uncritically. However, given the misgivings with which prior dependency studies have been received, at least in the United States, it may be useful to highlight several points about the books. I will address five areas in which I feel the books have an important contribution to make.

Definitions

The starting point for an appreciation of the two books is their definitions of development, which are profoundly different from those of conventional

development theory. First, a word on what development is not. It is not economic productivity, increases in GNP or GNP per capita, the spread of urbanization, literacy, and transporation, or improvement in quality of life indicators, such as reduced infant mortality, increased longevity, or better medical care. Neither is development necessarily the movement away from a dominant primary sector toward greater diversification of production and decreased reliance on external inputs. As Cardoso and Faletto put it:

. . . we do not mean by the notion of “development” the achievement of a more egalitarian or more just society. These are not consequences expected from capitalist development, especially in peripheral economies. . . . Development, in this context, means the progress in productive forces, mainly through the import of technology, capital accumulation, penetration of local economies by foreign enterprises, increasing numbers of wage-earning groups, and intensification of social division [of] labor (pp. 23–24).

The definition offered by Evans is similar to Cardoso and Faletto’s. In fact, it is clear that Evans is much influenced by the latter two. Perhaps more than Cardoso and Faletto, Evans emphasizes the accumulation of capital and industrialization on the periphery as the core phenomena of development:

dependent development implies both the accumulation of capital and some degree of industrialization on the periphery. Dependent development is a special instance of dependency, characterized by the association or alliance of international and local capital (p. 32).

Development, for both books, implies progress of the productive forces. Progress here does not have its usual normative implication of being desirable. It may entail improvement in material conditions or it may involve regress in these.

Causes of development

Despite the fact that the reception of dependency literature in the United States has taken the relationship between dependency and development as the centerpiece of analysis, I think it is fair to say that Cardoso and Faletto are not substantially concerned with this question. They are more concerned with development (i.e., development of the productive forces of capitalism) and how this affects the social and political struggles inside countries. Their primary task is to show how foreign capital interacts with domestic society to produce different alliances of social groups and, in turn, how these alliances attempt to use the state to further their own interests.

Cardoso and Faletto are also anxious to demonstrate how different modes of peripheral incorporation into the global system (e.g., enclave economies versus one dominated by local bourgeoisies), affect the entire process by which
capital is created, employed, valorized, and realized. It is worthwhile to quote these authors:

In enclave economies foreign invested capital originates in the exterior [italics], is incorporated into local productive processes, and transforms part of itself into wages and taxes. Its value is increased by the exploitation of local labor forces, which transform nature and produce goods that realize [italics] again the life of this capital when staples (oil, copper, bananas, etc.) are sold in the external markets [italics].

In economies controlled by local bourgeoisie, the circuit of capital is formally just the opposite. Accumulation is the result of the appropriation of natural resources by local entrepreneurs and the exploitation of the labor force by this same local group. The starting point for capital accumulation is thus internal [italics]. The process of capital valorization also takes place in the local productive process, but insofar as merchandise consists of staples and food products, the international market [italics] is required to realize the final steps of the capital circuit (p. xix).

A society is dependent then when it requires an outside complement to make possible the full circle of capital creation, expansion, and accumulation. Forms of dependency may vary widely so that the concrete expression which economic processes take will be different, but there is an underlying structural similarity beneath these various expressions.

The account of the different forms which capital accumulation can take, together with the social and political consequences of these, is a legitimate project, of course. Still, I am disappointed at the reluctance of Cardoso and Faletto to explicitly develop their theory. Indeed, as they suggest on several occasions, they are somewhat suspicious of the entire enterprise of theory-building and indeed can bring themselves to use the term only when putting it in quotes (pp. xii and xxiii).

I find this position troubling for the following reasons. Theory is after all only a proffered explanation; it is neither more nor less complicated than that. If we do not develop theories, we, by definition, do not offer explanations. In addition (and this is not a minor point) if the structure of an explanation is not developed, there is little we can do to falsify, and inversely to corroborate, the argument. Despite disfavor within dependencia circles of the criteria of falsifiability and verification, the scientific process cannot proceed without them. Outside of a scholastic preoccupation with logical canons such as consistency and deduction, which play a central role in formal modelling, there is simply no substitute for attempting to fit evidence into the explanatory structure of an argument.

While nearly everyone would agree, when put this way, I have difficulty imagining how a non-circular process of fit can take place without a theory—i.e., without an explanatory structure that is not merely a redundant
restatement of historical observations. To put this another way, a theory must offer more than a summary of, or even exhaustive restatement of, the facts used to develop it. Cardoso and Faletto's approach to historical analysis seems so close to the data that there is little room for testing ideas.

After having said this, it is necessary to add that the authors provide us with a subtle description of the narrative of dependent development, a narrative that never fails to show the complex interactions between various phase characteristics of international capitalism and the prevailing social, economic, and political conditions in dependent societies. The subtlety of the analysis is important, for it allows us to see the essential condition of domination existing across a variety of forms of organizational expression. This is a helpful antidote to overly simplistic rejections of "political causes" as explanations for underdevelopment.

From the beginning, Evans' Dependent Development is more satisfactory on the relationship between dependency and development. Indeed, I suspect that the book is self-consciously titled Dependent Development in order to suggest a category of development problems, rather than Dependency and Development which suggests two separate variables related to one another. Both terms really modify and limit the scope of the other. Thus, Evans is interested in countries that are simultaneously dependent and developing.

Though Brazil has been singled out, the most inclusive set of units suggested by Evans' theoretical focus is all of the peripheral capitalist countries which are industrializing. They are countries which are showing some movement; the object of Evans' analysis is to explain why. The key to this movement lies in the needs of capital accumulation. Evans shows how classic dependence in Brazil generated opposing forces which gradually undermined it. In this dialectical analysis, Evans concretizes for us that elusive "surplus" of which we so often hear. He brings this concept to life and provides it with some operational content by detailing how part of the excess value created from primary production and export went to the Brazilian elite, rather than foreign economic and political actors. In addition, he shows how the diversification of the origins of foreign investment, as well as imports and exports, gave the Brazilian state more room for maneuver. All in all, the book provides us with an impressive account of the long-term, structural, hegemonic forces as well as those countervailing forces which make change possible.

Interplay between internal and external factors

As the previous discussion has tried to show, much of traditional development theory has had a tendency to offer one-sided interpretations of

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the sources of development—showing a blind spot to either internal or external factors. Dependency theory was originally received in the United States in such a way as to highlight the external components of the theory so that soon dependency came to mean high trade reliance, necessity for outside markets, foreign technology, etc. Rarely was a serious internal analysis undertaken. This external interpretation was partly due to dependency writings, some of which oversimplified the forces involved. It was also due in part to an overzealous interpretation of the dependency literature in some academic circles, as well as to a confusion of dependency theory with the world systems approach. For example, Tony Smith writes that:

The chief feature of the dependency school is its insistence that it is not internal characteristics of particular countries so much as the structure of the international system—particularly in its economic aspects—that is the key variable to be studied in order to understand the form that development has taken in non-communist industrializing countries.22

Smith develops his argument further and argues that dependency theory “globalizes” national development and hence deprives local histories of their integrity.23 This interpretation of dependency, which reduces it to a set of external explanatory factors, is simply not based on an accurate reading of the dependency literature.

Cardoso and Faletto do not make the mistake of overemphasizing the global system and treating domestic society and politics as derivative. They take great pains to point out, in both the preface (xiv–xvi) and in the bulk of the book (chapters 3 to 5), that the interweaving of the internal and external is complicated and, in terms of influencing outcomes, the former is at least as important as the latter.

Although Cardoso and Faletto are strongly critical of writing which, in stressing global interpretations, treats domestic societies as derivative, they are also quick to point out that broad changes in the international economy (from mercantilism to monopoly capitalism to industrial capitalism), set important structural limits on the scope of actions domestically. But constraints, while they set limits, do not churn out specific behavioral outcomes. This is why a close detailed analysis of the social, economic, and political conditions within each country is necessary.

For Evans also the nodal point for analysis is the complex intersection among three major groups of actors: domestic capital interests, foreign capital, and the state in the dependent society. In providing the details of this three-way alliance, an alliance that sometimes resembles a tug-of-war, Evans does an excellent job of showing us how local capital and the Brazilian state have reacted to the development of foreign capital and industry. Foreign

23 Ibid., p. 257.
capital did not simply replace domestic capital; it built on top of it in many cases, added to it, and reinforced its existing structures. This is not to say that foreign capital "benignly complemented" (page 102) local capital, but it just as clearly is not a simple matter of denationalization by foreign interests.

Some of the dependency literature offers bland charges about the harmful effects of foreign capital penetration on development and leaves it at that. Evans goes well beyond that and offers us some specific case materials as well as some refined conclusions about the links among the state, foreign capital, and private capital. For example, he makes a serious effort to assess the characteristics of industries where local or foreign interests predominate. Local capital is strongest in small industries with low rates of growth while successful large Brazilian corporations are those which emphasize commercial and marketing strategies—not product development, innovation, research, etc. This process has two effects. The first is to reduce the role of local Brazilian industry in the high-technology, high-profit, oligopolistic parts of industrial activity. The second effect is a variation on the first. Even if Brazilian firms enter the oligopolistic industries, the functions within them relating to product innovation and high profits will remain under the control of firms in the center countries.

The role of the state

Though the state is the centerpiece of the discipline of political science, its position in relation to other social structures and to the economy has not been adequately developed. This is true whether the state is dealt with in Deutschian terms as a steering mechanism for the pursuit of societal goals, as a pluralist regulator of various group positions, or as a Marxian agent of class domination. There have been excellent studies of the operation of selected parts of the state—e.g., studies of legislatures, executives, foreign offices, as well as research on the relationship between parts of the private sector, for example, interest groups, and how they interact with the state bureaucracy.

However, what is needed for purposes of development studies is more than this. What is needed is a theory of the state\(^4\) not only in its internal workings, nor just in relation to organized pressure groups, but in relation to society as a whole. We need to know how the state, and by that I mean the institutions, roles, norms and behavioral patterns responsible for setting

policies and non-policies at the highest level, respond to, activate, and combine with various parts of the private sector in the pursuit of group goals. For Cardoso and Faletto, as well as for Evans, the state forms a crucial component of their analysis. Although the state definitely plays a role in the goals of dominant classes, it partly takes on an independent existence and develops its own social base—i.e., it explicitly cultivates the constellation of economic and social interests that support it. As Cardoso and Faletto point out, in some countries the state is used to build an industrial class (p. 128). In doing this, the state acts out its own version of primitive accumulation and must extract the necessary capital from taxes and duties while later that capital reproduces itself and expands, due to the profits accumulated by the state enterprises (p. 203).

It is interesting to note, in an analysis that owes much to Marxism, that the state is involved in the very process of class formation, rather than passively executing an already formed class interest. In carrying out this project, the state forges an alliance among the internationalized sector, the public bureaucracies, and the local bourgeoisie.

Much the same line of analysis is pursued by Evans. Evans is at pains to stress that the state enters the alliance with local and foreign capital not as a "third partner" but as a motivator of local capital (pp. 39-43). Consistent with the general approach, Evans treats the role of the state in historical terms, from the earliest periods when the state limited itself to "... counter the reluctance of international capital to invest in the development of Brazil" (p. 84), to the period of the late 1950s where the ideology of "desenvolvimentoismo" held sway and the state's share of investment in the economy increased (p. 93), to the period of multinational expansion where the state enterprises kept pace with the growth of foreign investment (p. 222).

Finally, the role of the state in dependent development is not without important macro effects. To single out one of the most important of these effects, one has only to recall Evans' point about the way state enterprises affect the balance between local and foreign capital. If one looks only to the distribution of private local and foreign shares in Brazil, one soon comes to the conclusion that the multinationals are gaining ground. However, once state enterprises are taken into account, this unfavorable distribution is reversed. In other words, the state is more than a broker between foreign and domestic interests. It also performs an independent entrepreneurial role, and by this latter function, acts as a regulator of the distribution of foreign and local capital in Brazil.

*Historical-structural analysis*

One source of resistance on the part of social scientists to a more thorough use of history is the feeling that history refers to events in the past which are idiosyncratic, which cannot be explained, and which therefore can only be
described. This feeling is one with deep roots in Western thought. Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics*,\(^{25}\) distinguished between the "necessary" and the "accidental," the former dealing with the descriptive and theoretical regularities of nature and the latter with random factors. The outer boundaries of science were limited by the domain of regularities. As Robert Nisbet has shown, these two aspects of our social past have spawned two important intellectual traditions, the past of the historian, where "the past is conceived as a kind of genealogy of events, acts, happenings, and persons" and "the developmental past," where particular events are fitted into longer-term regularities.\(^{26}\) According to the first view, as Binder points out, history is the very antithesis of social science, since it describes what science cannot systematically investigate.\(^{27}\)

Much in line with Nisbet's distinction, I would argue that a related barrier to a proper understanding of dependency theory lies in the very different views of history held by mainstream development theorists and those held by dependency theorists. These differences do not show up at the level of explicit formulation of arguments. Rather they are embedded in the very ways in which scholars think about the past, and from this, how they attempt to reconstruct it. And since the differences are part of the "inaudible major premises" of research, rather than its public argument, it is difficult to provide a clear reconstruction of what these arguments are. Despite this, these alternative conceptions of the past correspond to deep differences in cognitive styles and no doubt form an important pillar for "the consumption of dependency theory" outside of Latin America.

Although there are many different conceptions of the past, for purposes of argument I will outline only two. I will refer to these two historical views as the formalist position (characterizing the positivist approach to science) and the developmentalist position (after Nisbet's designation). These two positions are different in two important respects, in regard to the issue of historical patterns and to their respective conceptions of time.

**Historical pattern**

The formalist position is a straightforward one. The past exists as a set of events that have already occurred and the task of the historian is to uncover them and to fit them into their proper (i.e. temporally accurate) positions and


sequences. In this search to represent the past *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* the historian is not guided (or misguided) by any prior notions of historical pattern or form (i.e., by ideas of progress, or progress and decay, or eras, stages, etc.) The past is more seamless, unstructured, and without necessary temporal coherence. This is not the same as saying that historical events are random or uncaused but rather to argue that these causal patterns are not necessarily isomorphic with any temporal metric we possess.

The methodological implications of this viewpoint are important. Since the past is cut out of one cloth—i.e., there are no major discontinuities represented by qualitatively different eras, stages, etc.—it follows that there is a certain uniformity to its theoretical structure. Events, sequences, and personalities will of course change but this phenomenal diversity will be reduced to unity at the theoretical level. Descriptive variety and theoretical unity; this is the formula of the positive approach to history. Thus, a critical assumption of the formalist position is an ahistorical one—the laws of science do not change. Closely related to this position is the assumption of the comparability of historical cases. It matters not from what region in time a particular case (e.g., a case of state-formation) is drawn; its theoretical properties—the laws providing the relations among key variables—will be constant.

In sharp contrast to the formalist position, the developmental view of history is filled with imagery of historical patterns. The past is not shapeless; it has a definite structure and there are discoverable laws of motion to describe and explain these structures. This historical approach is rooted in classical Greek thought, especially in the seminal idea of *physis*, literally "the way things grow." Every living thing had a *physis*—i.e., a pattern of growth and a pattern of decline. The task of the scientist is to discover the pattern of growth and decline peculiar to the living entity being studied.

Among the patterns that exist in history are cycles, epics, progress, and stages. The idea of a cycle is very close to the original conception of *physis*. It refers to a pattern of motion characterized by growth and decay, ups and downs, beginnings, ends, and renewals. An epic involved the idea of beginning and end too, but the idea of recurrence is lost. An epic does not repeat itself, at least not in the same way. Therefore, the period of time marked out by the epic defines the stretch of time during which relations among variables are constant, but, once outside these boundaries, the relations themselves are subject to change. Progress, an idea central to nineteenth-century sociology, represents the idea of change in a consistent direction—in fact, in a normatively approved direction. Finally, the idea of stages combines aspects of epics (the assumption of qualitative differences in relations across time periods) with the idea of progress. Stages come through most forcefully in

28 For a discussion of this concept see Gary Gereffi, "Theories of Societal Development: An Overview," mimeo (January 1979), pp. 3-8.
29 The first three of these patterns are discussed by Gereffi, ibid.
Marxist historiography where capitalism goes through various eras that are different in important ways but are, nevertheless, connected by the laws of motion of economic development.

**Views of time**

The formalist and developmentalist positions are also distinguished by a subsidiary idea, namely their contrasting views of time. The time of the formalist approach is Newtonian. It is homogeneous, infinitely divisible, and purely formal. Homogeneity refers to the uniformity of time at every region of its duration. Ultimately, this means that each segment of time marks off equal segments of the physical reality it mirrors. Divisibility refers to how finely or grossly time may be aggregated and disaggregated. Since physical time is continuous there is no limit on either aggregation or disaggregation. Finally, we say that Newtonian time is formal because it is devoid of any qualities, that is, it is abstract and does not stand for specific events, least of all events drawn from the social world. While this position is not ultimately true, in the sense that even Newtonian time is based on physical processes (e.g., the motion of the earth, the movement of the stars, the amount of energy emitted by an electron), these reference systems are quite removed from our ordinary experience and so the time originally based on them assumes a disembodied form of its own.

The developmentalist position is just the reverse. Time is lumpy, nonhomogeneous, not infinitely divisible, and qualitative. Time is likely to be thought of as the actual transpiring of social, economic, and political events and processes. Here a subtle though important change takes place. In physical time, these same events and processes are mapped into the time metric. This metric provides a grid within which we locate historical events and processes. This grid, itself a given and unquestioned, becomes the anchor point for the analysis of other events. All other processes and relationships are expressed as transformations within this fixed grid. In the developmental perspective, time is no longer so abstract. Instead the events and processes of the social-political world become the metric—i.e., they become the language within which we directly describe reality as well as the metric by which we judge the temporal properties of other events.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the dependency tradition is much closer to the developmental than to the formalist position. Though this

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31 This kind of time is close to Sorokin's sociocultural time; see Sorokin, ibid., pp. 158-226.

32 Sorokin, ibid., p. 159.
literature owes much to the earlier ideas of cycles, eras, and progress, dependency writers have put these ideas together in a unique way. History is treated as a series of eras which, instead of being historically discrete (i.e. non-overlapping), are layered on top of one another, each one different from those historically prior periods while at the same time containing traces of the history of prior eras.

All these temporal patterns are present. There are cycles of growth and decay manifested in the rise and decline of various forms of dependent capitalist development—e.g., slave-plantation systems, mercantile capitalism, industrial capitalism. Both books give detailed attention to the rise and fall of these particular forms of dependent development. While these cyclical movements are themselves important, it is also important to recognize that their movements are not autonomous and that they occur within a bounded frame, within another set of motions. Thus, while the cyclical aspect of the explanation charts the growth and decay of various expressions of dependent development, it does not describe the essence of the beast but rather of discontinuous stages in the beast's life.

Epics, or eras, are present in dependency analyses also. These are the periods bounded by the beginning and end points of the cycles. While epics and cycles occupy the same stretch of time, the focus is completely different. The focus in cyclical analyses is on the movements within periods, while epics stress the constancy of analyses within periods and the differences across periods. Cyclical analyses correspond to the concrete analyses of the forces that promote the origin, growth, and decay of one particular organization of production and distribution, while eras correspond to the broad qualitative shifts in these patterns of organization and the ways in which these new configurations affect the relations among social classes and political processes.

Finally, the idea of progress is present both within the cycles themselves (by definition) as well as across eras, which though qualitatively different at one level, are linked by the movement of productive forces at another level. Thus, the process of accumulation, i.e., accumulation of productive forces, is the unifying concept, and this is a process which changes, however fitfully and uncertainly, across all the time periods.

The use of the historical method by all three authors points to some important methodological implications which are further suggested by their similarities with the comparative method. The first thing to note is that what we have been calling an epic, or era, operates in a way that is formally identical to what Przeworski and Teune call "system-level differences"33 within the context of cross-country comparisons. Roughly speaking, a system-level difference is said to exist when relations among variables within countries differ across several countries—e.g., the relationship between educational

levels and political participation may vary for India, West Germany, and Great Britain, and where, in addition, one can explain these cross-national variations by appealing to some distinguishing aspect of the various political systems.

Although comparative and historical inquiry are generally seen as distinct research approaches, and for good reason, there is also an important formal similarity underlying them. In both kinds of research we are interested in the discovery of relations among variables (i.e., social laws) that are more or less invariant, for plainly an expressed relationship that fluctuates from case to case, or time period to time period, is of little help. However, rarely is reality so compliant as to produce relations which are temporally and spatially invariant. This leads us to approach the problem in the following way: we recognize that both historical and comparative laws are bounded—i.e., the laws themselves have a context. In the case of comparative laws, these boundaries are spatially organized, while for historical laws, they are temporally organized.

The argument here is that the nature of these boundaries is not fundamentally different in the two cases. Quite the contrary, they are remarkably similar and this is so because the contexts of historical and comparative laws are composed of the same elementary material—relatively stable but unrecognized configurations among theoretically exogenous properties. With respect to eras, these configurations are stable within eras and change across them while with respect to systems, countries, or territorial units, relations are stable within and different across geographical boundaries.

In both cases context "affects" the relationship in question because it functions as a summary term for a host of unidentified properties, properties on which the operation of social laws depends. The methodological task is the same in both cases, namely to unpack the context in order to identify the variables responsible for the shift in parameters expressing the laws. The recommendation made by Przeworski and Teune to reconcile differences in relations among variables across countries is as follows:

The bridge between temporally specific observations and general theory is the substitution of variables for proper names of social systems in the course of comparative research. 14

While Przeworski and Teune use the vocabulary of historical analysis, what they have in mind are relations peculiar to different territorial systems—not temporal ones. Indeed, they have no temporally analogous concept for the spatial concept of system-level variables. To extend their logic to the temporal realm, we may say:

The bridge between temporally specific observations and general theory lies in the substitution of variables (or conjunctions of variables) for the concrete names of time periods, eras, etc. . . .

14 Przeworski and Teune, ibid., p. 25.
To carry this argument further, let us draw out just one of the methodological implications of the historical approach, that deriving from the identification of eras. An era, or period, is a stretch of time within which contextual factors remain relatively constant. Since contextual factors in effect define the content of what is generally relegated to "ceteris paribus" in social theory, changes in context, and thus in eras, identify the breakpoints beyond which a social regularity will no longer hold. The position that no such breakpoints exist, or that they can easily be met by technical adjustments, such as dummy variables, is the ahistorical position. Thus, when a dependency theorist speaks of mercantile capitalism, industrial capitalism, financial capitalism, or the "new dependency era," we should take this as more than a labelling exercise, but rather as an effort to establish the conditions under which a historical generalization holds.

Structural analysis

Coupled with the historical approach, dependency analysis is structural (i.e., it focuses on stable, persistent, though not unchanging patterns). These structural factors may have to do with the links between the peripheral economy and the global system, the forms of foreign penetration, etc. Although these links are not fluid and do not provide the raw material for a behavioral analysis, they are subject to change. This is where the authors, particularly Cardoso and Faletto, find the link between historical and structural analysis.

The implications of this methodology are significant. First of all, behavioral changes—i.e., those transpiring within structural contexts which themselves change infrequently—become less important. Second, since Cardoso and Faletto are interested in these structural changes, they are severely limited in the number of independent cases to be examined. This degrees-of-freedom problem is further aggravated by the fact that in each society the domestic conditions surrounding the insertion of that society into the global system are likely to be different. In formal terms, dependency theorists are likely to be handicapped by inadequate degrees of freedom to unravel the historical puzzles.35

35 The degrees of freedom problem is not just a statistical concern but one that is rooted in all inductive inferences. The general problem arises when there are several explanations to account for an observed phenomenon but where the set of observations (cases or time points) is inadequate to discriminate among competing interpretations. This problem is likely to be especially severe in the social sciences where, in addition to the predominance of multicausal explanations, social phenomenon are likely to be affected by rare conjunctions of variables in an interactive rather than additive way. For example, in an additive world, if there are five variables thought to affect a phenomenon of interest, there are only five competing explanations. In an interactive world, there are 120 separate explanations (5 factorial). The data base necessary to discriminate among these would have to be quite large.
Nevertheless, there is a structure to dependency theory, and if it experiences difficulties in the testing stage, this is due to insufficient variability of cases in the world. The form of the theory includes a set of general factors describing the changes in the global capitalist system, and a set of specific or contextual factors relevant to individual cases (whether countries or time periods). These act together to produce outcomes that may vary from country to country. They are outcomes that are explainable by reference to a theory incorporating statements about both the international system and domestic societies.

In short, what we mean when we say “historical” is that generalizations may be temporally limited, that cases for analysis may not always be drawn from any historical time period, and that indicators and strategies of measurement may change across periods.

These discontinuities are not often appreciated by people who do research. In both of the books under review, there are important historical discontinuities, in particular, there is a real sense in which the history of the advanced, capitalist countries has “preempted” a possible, even probable, history of the currently developing countries. Part of the reason that the early industrializers succeeded in developing is that they consolidated their economies at the same time that the world market offered large opportunities for expansion, and with no “superior” countries to interfere. Thus, we should not expect to see the less developed countries today remake themselves in the same image as the European societies during the eighteenth century. History should still be studied not primarily because it provides a crystal ball enabling us to forecast the future image of the less developed countries, but rather because it allows presently developed countries to catch a glimpse of their historical “alter ego.”

**Intellectual implications of the two books**

It should be clear from what I have said up to this point that there are important intellectual implications deriving from the two books, although the extent to which these implications have an effect depends upon the reception of these ideas. These implications are several.

First, both books reject a narrowly disciplinary approach to the study of dependent development and take a perspective that draws on political science, sociology, economics, and anthropology. The dangers of an interdisciplinary orientation are well known in a time when knowledge has become so specialized. But Cardoso, Faletto, and Evans avoid all the traps: superficiality, amateurism, a fragmented attempt to mix together incommensurable insights from different fields, etc. There is not only an impressive integration of knowledge displayed in these two books, but also a keen sense of hierarchy among political, economic, social, and cultural forces.
Second, these two books are integrative in two additional senses: first, they combine the internal and the external causes of development and second, they break down traditional barriers between international relations and comparative politics.

Third, both books reintroduce class politics into American political science. The reasons for the underdevelopment of class perspectives is a complex issue that has a lot to do with the historical development of the U.S. political economy. To some extent it is also probably due to the disciplinary split in the academic world between economics and political science.

Fourth, both books are sensitive to structure and behavior—i.e., to concrete activities of groups and people but within a context shaped by macro forces. Thus, while the authors think in terms of alternatives and choices, they are likely to think of “constrained choices” and “bounded alternatives.” Conversely, while they may think in deterministic terms, it is a “soft determinism”—i.e., one that sets limits rather than specific outcomes.

Finally, both books have some sense of the stability of the factors making for underdevelopment and hence are likely to be skeptical of suggestions for policy changes, such as those emanating from the new international economic order, or interdependence, or collective self-reliance. Their analyses of dependent development suggests that the forces underlying underdevelopment are not fragile, that they do not rest upon one particular historical expression, such as colonialism, or on special economic arrangements, such as the division of the world into exporters of primary and manufactured products.37

There are some criticisms I could make of these two books but on the whole I find their merits so strong as to make a detailed critique misplaced. Let it suffice for me to merely mention a few points. First, neither book makes much progress with the idea of “degrees of dependency” and Cardoso and Faletto seem to argue that to attempt to do so would be pointless (p. 12). Why this is so is not clear to me and given the authors’ definition of dependence (p. xx), I can see no reason why we can’t speak intelligently of “more” and “less” dependency, in addition to changes in the qualitative forms of dependency. Second, although the existence of different periods describing different phases in the progression of capitalism at the global level played an important part in the analysis, there was very little effort to provide systematic criteria for identifying periods and for making public the rules signifying shifts from one to another. Third, and this criticism applies only to Dependency and Development in Latin America, the authors relied very little on systematic

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37 A weak point of theories of international inequality based on properties of the exchange system—e.g., the terms of trade argument—is that they predict changes in relative positions depending on changes in supply and demand, availability of substitutes and partners, and bargaining positions. Given the flux along these lines, one would expect dependency reversals to be a relatively common occurrence.
reproducible evidence to support their arguments. On several important occasions, arguments were simply made by assertion (pp. 76, 83, 160) or were backed by evidence of the most illustrative nature. The fact that the authors in this case are wise observers who hold the respect of the academic community should not lead us to imitate this particular aspect of their methodological approach.

Despite these reservations, the bulk of my arguments should reflect a positive evaluation of both books and a hope that they will be carefully read by all scholars interested in dependency and development. Though the two books are modest in terms of claiming substantive or methodological novelty, there is a great deal offered along both lines.