Economics 201

INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS

Fall 2016
 
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D.  Game Theory and Competitive Strategy

1.  Concepts

a.  Game - players make strategic decisions that take into account each other's actions and responses

b.  Payoff - value associated with a possible outcome

c.  Strategy - rule or plan of action for playing a game

d.  Payoff matrix - table showing payoffs to each player for each combination of decisions made

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e.  Cooperative game - participants can negotiate binding contracts that allow them to plan joint strategies

f.  Noncooperative game  - negotiation and enforcement of binding contracts is not possible

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2.  Dominant strategy

  • Strategy that is optimal no matter what an opponent does

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  • Prisoners' Dilemma - players acting in their own self interest are worse off than if they had cooperated

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3.  Nash equilibrium

  • Each firm does the best it can given its competitors' actions

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a.  Maximin strategy

  • Maximize the minimum gain that can be earned

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b.  Maximize expected payoff

  • Assign probabilities to actions by competitors

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c.  "Battle of the sexes"

  • Competitors do the same thing

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4.  Repeated games

  • Actions taken and payoffs made over and over again

  • Tit-for-tat strategy - player matches opponents last decision

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a.  Infinitely repeated game

  • Cooperative behavior is the rational response to tit-for-tat strategy

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b.  Finite number of repetitions

  • Game unravels as each competitor looks at last month

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  • Competition can break down due to:

- Too many firms - difficult to coordinate

- Rapidly shifting demand or cost conditions - difficult to agree on right course of action

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5.  Sequential games

  • One player can move first

  • First mover may have an advantage

  • Extensive form of a game - use a decision tree

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6.  Competitive strategy

a.  Threats

  • Threat must be credible to have impact

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b.  Commitment and credibility

  • Commitment can be used to increase credibility

  • Reputation important in establishing credibility

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c.  Bargaining strategy

  • Might be able to link two or more bargaining problems

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d.  Entry deterrence

  • Incumbent firm must convince potential entrants that entry will be unprofitable

  • Commitment is again important

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7.  Auctions

  • Auction market - products bought and sold through formal bidding

  • Reservation price - the value an individual places on a product

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a.  Types of auctions

(1)  English (oral) auction

  • Seller solicits progressively higher bids from potential buyers

  • Less risk to buyer as they can always up the bid

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(2)  Dutch auction

  • Price starts high and is then lowered until someone buys

  • Risk to buyer of not getting product if they wait too long

(3)  Sealed-bid auction

  • All bids made simultaneously in sealed envelopes

(a)  First-price auction - sales price is the highest bid

(b) Second-price auction - high bid wins, but sales price is the second highest bid

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b.  Value and information

(1)  Private-value auctions

  • Each bidder knows their individual valuation

  • Uncertain about value others place on product

  • English auction and second-price sealed bid auctions yield similar results

  • Dutch auction and first-price sealed bid auctions yield similar results

  • Maximum bid should be the reservation price

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(2)  Common-value auctions

  • Item auctioned has approximately the same value to all bidders

  • Estimates will still differ though

  • Winner's Curse - winner of an auction worse off because of overvaluation

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  • Maximum bid should be below the estimated valuation to factor in the Winner's Curse