Economics 373

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS

Spring 2015
 
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Answers to Recommended Problems II

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Chapter 10

1.

a.  HI = 702 + 202 + 102 = 5400

b.  HI = 502 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 + 52 = 2750

c.  HI = 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 = 1000   

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2. a.

Qi = 1 / (n + 1) * QC

P = MC => P = 0 => QC = 10 - 0 = 10

Qi = 1 / (4 + 1) * 10 = 2  

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3.

a.

QT = 4 * 2 = 8 => 8 = 10 - P => P = 2

b.

n = 3 => Qi = 1 / (3 + 1) * 10 = 2.5

QT = 3 * 2.5 = 7.5 => 7.5 = 10 - P => P = 3  

Chapter 11

1.

  Firm B:  Low Price Firm B:  High Price
Firm A:  Low Price 1, 1 3, -2
Firm A:  High Price -2, 3 2, 2

a.  A's dominant strategy is low price.

b.  B's dominant strategy is low price.

c.  The optimal strategy would be for each firm to go low price.

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2.

  Firm B:  Low Price Firm B:  High Price
Firm A:  Low Price 1, 1 3, -1
Firm A:  High Price -2, 3 4, 2

a.  A has no dominant strategy.

b.  B's dominant strategy is low price.

c.  The optimal strategy for B would be to go low price.  Given that, A's optimal strategy would be to go low price.

d.  The Nash equilibrium is for A to go low price and B to go low price, yielding a profit of 1 for each firm.

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8. 

  Firm B:  Cheat Firm B:  Don't Cheat
Firm A:  Cheat 4, 3 8, 1
Firm A:  Don't Cheat 2, 6 6, 5

a.  The dominant strategy for each firm would be to cheat.  This is the Prisoners' Dilemma because they would have been better off if they had cooperated and didn't cheat.

b.

  Firm B:  Cheat Firm B:  Don't Cheat
Firm A:  Cheat 4, 3 8, 1
Firm A:  Don't Cheat 5, 5 6, 5

A now has no dominant strategy.  B's dominant strategy is still to cheat.  Given that, the Nash equilibrium would be for B to cheat and A to not cheat.

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10.

  Firm B:  Enter Firm B:  Don't Enter
Firm A:  Low Price 3, -1 3, 1
Firm A:  High Price 4, 5 6, 3

a.  A's dominant strategy is to go with a high price.  B has no dominant strategy, but given A's, the Nash equilibrium would be for B to enter.

b.  A's threat is not credible because its dominant strategy is to go with a high price.

c.  Skip

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13.

      Jumbo          
-------------------- -10, -10
  Jumbo
--------------------
Airbus  
      No Jumbo        
-------------------- 100, 0
Boeing      
      Jumbo          
-------------------- 120, 80
  Sonic
--------------------
Airbus  
      No Jumbo        
-------------------- 150, 0

a.  Boeing's best strategy is to go with the Sonic.

b.  Airbus's best strategy is to respond with the Jumbo.

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14.

a.  The difference is that Boeing made the first move.

b.

      Jumbo          
-------------------- -10, -10
  Jumbo
--------------------
Airbus  
      No Jumbo        
-------------------- 100, 0
Boeing      
      Jumbo          
-------------------- 150, 80
  Sonic
--------------------
Airbus  
      No Jumbo        
-------------------- 120, 0

There is no change in the result from question 13.